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This dissertation studies important issues in supply chain management
and marketing interface research: competition, product line design, and chan-
nel efficiency, at the presence of vertically differentiated products. Vertical
differentiation as a means of price discrimination has been well-studied in both
economics and marketing literature. However, less attention has been paid on
how vertical differentiation has been operationalized. In this dissertation, we
focus our study on two types of vertical differentiation: the one created by a
product line which is produced by the same firm, and the one created by prod-
ucts from different firms. We especially are interested in the so-called private
label products vs. the national brand products. Specifically, this disserta-
tion explores how vertical differentiation can affect the interactions among the
members of a supply chain in several different contexts. In the first piece of
viii
work, we use a game theoretic model to explore how the ability of a retailer to
introduce a private label product affects its interaction with a manufacturer
of a national brand. In the second essay, we are investigating how an original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) will be affected by the entry of a competitor
when there are strategic suppliers of a critical component. If these suppliers
behave strategically, it is not clear that the entry of other players will necessar-
ily be harmful to the incumbent. In the last work, we pay our attention to an
emerging change happening in the industry: some retailers begin to sell their
private labels through their competitors. We investigate the strategic role of
a retailer selling her own private label products through another retailer. In
summary, this dissertation illustrates how vertical differentiation play a cru-
cial role in firms’ supply chain as well as marketing strategies. Therefore, it
is important for firms to recognize these strategic issues related to vertically
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Operations management (OM) and marketing as stand-alone disciplines
have been deeply pursued by both academia and practitioners during the past
decades. Operations Management discipline has emerged from fields of oper-
ations research and industrial engineering and has become a major focus of
business research, together with finance and marketing. During the last forty
years or so, it has gone through different emphases on topics studied, such as
MRP, JIT, and TQM. Starting from the late 1990s, researchers have recognized
that operations is only one functional area and, to be successful, operations
management researchers must interface with their peers in the research fields
of marketing, finance, engineering, and other functional areas. Therefore, in
addition to the knowledge of operations research tools, operations manage-
ment researchers must also understand business strategy, marketing concepts,
financial tools, and effectiveness of information technology (systems). In this
dissertation, we focus our research on interfaces between operations manage-
ment and marketing.
As the business environment becomes more competitive, supply chain
management has become a topic of interest to many people. Efficient and
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effective supply chain management strategy has been widely recognized as
value maximization, process integration, responsiveness improvement, and cy-
cle time reduction. Although much attention has been paid to the increase in
efficiency that has occurred in retail channels over the past twenty years, the
gains are typically attributed to either the role of information technology in
facilitating practices such as vendor managed inventory (VMI), collaborative
planning forecasting and replenishment (CPFR), etc. or to the consolidation
among retailers and redesign of store formats, i.e. e-tailing and big-box. One
of the consequences of having fewer, bigger retailers, is that many of them
now have sufficient economies of scale to be able to produce their own private
label products. For example, H-E-B, which operates over 300 grocery stores
in Texas and Mexico, carries more than 3,000 items under the brand names of
Hill Country Fare and H-E-B, and operates its own manufacturing operations
for many of these. Once a retailer has developed the capability of producing
its own private label in a category, it has one more alternative to consider in
its assortment, pricing and promotional planning, and this may give it more
leverage with respect to a national brand manufacturer(s). On the other hand,
because the retailer is self-interested, her decision to develop private label ca-
pability may not necessarily benefit the supply chain as a whole.
In the first essay, we use a game theoretical model to explore how the
ability of a retailer to introduce a private label product affects its interactions
with a manufacturer of a national brand. This work was motivated by the ob-
servation that although a retailer’s decision to introduce a private label product
2
may lead to a sub-optimal product line, it will also tend to put pressure on the
manufacturer’s margin, dampening the effects of double-marginalization. The
main thrust of this work is to explore this trade-off between the efficiency of
the product line and double marginalization, and we pay special attention to
how this trade-off may depend on the characteristics of the product category.
We first distinguish between the characteristics of private label products
that are structurally efficient, i.e. they would be introduced as product-line
extensions by a vertically integrated channel, vs. those that are structurally
inefficient. Then we show that although retailers may introduce private la-
bels that are structurally inefficient, depending upon the cost structure, this
may or may not benefit the overall channel of distribution. When the develop-
ment cost of the private label is not too high, its mitigating effects upon double
marginalization can dominate its structural inefficiency. In an extension to our
basic model, we consider the strategic interaction between a retailer’s ability
to develop a private label and her ability to stimulate demand through promo-
tion. Interestingly, the two capabilities can be either strategic complements or
substitutes, depending upon the efficiency (cost/quality ratio) of the private
label relative to the national brand.
In the second essay, we investigate how an original equipment manu-
facturer (OEM) will be affected by the entry of a competitor when there are
strategic suppliers of a critical component. For example, Apple cannot produce
the iPod without high quality compact hard drives, of which there are rela-
tively few suppliers. If these suppliers behave strategically, it is not clear that
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the entry of other personal music devices will necessarily be harmful to Apple.
In our analysis, we show that, if the relative perceived quality of the entrant’s
product is neither too low nor too high, its entry may benefit the incumbent.
The reason is that, in response to the entry of the lower quality OEM, the
suppliers respond by increasing their output quantities which would decrease
the price at which the components can be acquired. As a consequence, it is
possible for the incumbent OEM to benefit more from the reduction in pro-
curement cost than he is hurt by the cannibalization from the entrant OEM.
Of course, in order for this to happen, the supply industry must be sufficiently
strategic. That is, if there are too many suppliers, then the entry of the new
OEM does not have a sufficient impact on the price of components to provide
enough benefit to the incumbent OEM to offset the cannibalization.
The above result is noteworthy because, while others have demon-
strated that a firm can benefit from competition from a lower quality product,
the existing results depend upon network effects in one form or another. Our
result is independent of any network effects, and is instead driven by the
strategic behavior of suppliers.
Both essays demonstrate the impact of supply chain structure on sup-
ply chain efficiency as well as individual supply chain members. In the last
essay, we turn our attention to the supply chain design issue from a different
angle. During the last decades, private label products are widely seen in re-
tailscape. The world is changing from dominated by manufacturer brands to
a mix of manufacturer brands and retailer owned brands. The name ”private
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labels” comes from the fact that most of the retailer brands, if not all, were
carried exclusively by the owners of those brands. For example, major U.S. re-
tail chains such as Wal-Mart, Target, JCPenney, and big-boxes such as Costco
and Sam’s Club, have aggressively entered the private label markets during
the last decades. Costco’s Kirkland Signature, JCPenney’s Arizona, and other
retailer owned brands become more and more popular among consumers now.
However, over time, we started to notice a change in the retail industry. A few
retailers begin to distribute their private label products through their com-
peting retailers. For example, starting on the fall of 2008, Safeway began to
roll out its popular O’s organic foods and Eating Right healthy foods store
brands to a wider audience – competing food retailers in the U.S. – along
with to grocers globally. At the end of year 2008, as one of the largest office
supply providers in U.S., OfficeMax partnered with Safeway to provide office
products and school supplies to grocery stores. More recently, Sears Holdings
Corp. has agreed to sell its popular Craftsman tool brand through Ace Hard-
ware stores, as the company turns again to outsiders to help grow its sales. We
are interested in the following research questions. First, if you are a marketing
manager of Safeway or OfficeMax, when should you keep your retailer brands
private? When should you share your retailer brands with your competing
retailers? If you are the marketing manager of the national brand manufac-
turer, what’s the implication for you when your retailer keeps its retailer brand
private or shares it with other retailers of yours? Finally, is it to the channel’s
best interest when a retailer shares its retailer brand with its competitors?
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We study the problem in a supply chain with a national brand manu-
facturer selling to through two retailers. One of the retailers owns a retailer
brand. We first examine the basic case in which retailers operate in indepen-
dent markets. Our analysis shows that selling the retailer brand through the
other retailer has a strategic effect of inducing a lower wholesale price of the
national brand. We also find that the total sales of retailer brand may decrease
if the retailer sells her retailer brand to the other retailer. However, accord-
ing to our analysis, we are able to show that it may be at the retailer’s best
interest to share her retailer brand with the competitor when the perceived
quality level of the retailer brand is neither too low nor too high and when
the market size of the other retailer is large enough. By exploring the case in
which retailers compete in the same market, we find that competition plays
an important role in deciding whether to sell the retailer brand through the
competitor.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we
discuss the basic modeling components which are common adopted in each of
the three essays. In Chapter 3, we discuss the impact of private label develop-
ment on supply chain efficiency. In Chapter 4, we discuss the strategic effects
of competition and product line efficiency in the presence of strategic suppli-
ers. In Chapter 5, we investigate the underlying reasoning of why retailers
choose to sell their retailer brands through competitors. Finally, in Chapter 6,
we provide managerial implications for firms involving vertically differentiated




2.1 The Product Space
Products in today’s markets are almost always differentiated by some
characteristic.1 The question is, how can we describe the differentiation be-
tween the products within a category. This question has been answered by sev-
eral economists. Among others, Hotelling (1929, [20]), Chamberlin (1951, [7];
1962, [8]), and Lancaster (1966, [25]) provide good answers. A product can
be described as a bundle of characteristics: quality, location, time, availabil-
ity, consumers’ information about its existence and quality, and so on. Each
consumer has a ranking over the mix of variables.
We may include all potential characteristics for a product. By doing
this, we provide a rich description about the product. However, it is likely
to be of little help in studying issues of supply chain management. Both in
empirical work and theoretical work, researchers focus their attention on a
small subset of characteristics and on a special (but, if possible, reasonable)
description of preferences. There are three commonly adopted approaches in
the literature.
1The main content of this section draws mainly from Tirole (1988, [47]).
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2.1.1 Vertical Differentiation
In a vertically differentiated product category, all consumers agree over
the most preferred mix of characteristics and, more generally, over the prefer-
ence ordering. A typical example is quality. Most agree that higher quality
is preferable – for instance, that a Volve is preferable to a Hyundai. This
preference does not imply that all consumers buy the Volve. However, more
consumers may still purchase the latter. The consumers’ income and the prices
of the cars, and of servicing them, determine the consumers’ ultimate choice.
We will describe this point in detail in the following sections. Similarly, a
smaller and more powerful computer is preferable to a larger, less powerful
one. At equal prices there is a natural ordering over the characteristic space.
In our work, we focus exclusively in vertically differentiated product
categories. We deter the detailed discussion to the following sections.
2.1.2 Horizontal Differentiation
For some characteristics, the optimal choice (at equal prices) depends
on the particular consumer. Tastes vary in the population. An obvious ex-
ample is the case of colors. Another example is location. The University of
Texas at Austin students are likely to prefer textbooks that are available in
Austin to textbooks that are physically the same but are available only in
Paris. Similarly, consumers will prefer to go to a store or supermarket that
is near their places. Different from the case of vertical differentiation, in such
cases of horizontal or ”spatial” differentiation, there are no ”goods” or ”bads”.
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Example
A simple example, the so-called ”linear city” model, is provided in
Hotelling (1929, [20]). Consider a ”linear city” of length 1. Consumers are
distributed uniformly along the city. Two shops, located at the two ends of
the city, both sell the same physical product. The location of shop 1 is x = 0,
and that of shop 2 is x = 1. (See Figure 2.1.) Consumers have transportation
cost t per unit of length. They consume one or zero unit of the product. Let
p1 and p2 denote the prices charged by the two shops. The ”generalized price”
of going to shop 1 (respectively, shop 2) for a consumer with coordinate x is
p1 + tx (respectively, p2 + t(1 − x)). If s̄ denotes the surplus enjoyed by each
consumer when he is consuming the product, the utility of a consumer located
at x is
s̄ − p1 − tx (2.1)
if he buys from shop 1,
s̄ − p2 − t(1 − x) (2.2)
if he buys from shop 2, and zero otherwise. The demand functions can be de-
rived from the above utility functions. We omit the details in this dissertation.
Interested readers can refer to Tirole (1988, [47]) for detailed derivation.
2.1.3 ”Products-Characteristics” Approach
Products are defined as bundles of characteristics, and consumers have
preferences over characteristics. The consumers may have heterogeneous pref-
erences over characteristics. We assume that each consumer only consumes one
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unit of the products under consideration. We may also assume that consumers
can consume multiple products. Furthermore, we can assume that what the
consumers care about are the characteristics of the products. For examples,
there are multiple products contain protein and vitamins, which consumers
care about from those products. Each product contains a combination of pro-
tein and vitamins. When consumers consume a bundle of products, they are
indifferent among bundles providing the same amount of protein and vitamins.
This approach is pioneered by Lancaster (1966, [25]).
2.2 The Demand Model
In our work, we adopt the vertical differentiation approach as described
in Section 2.1.1. In this section, we derive the demand model which will be used
in the rest of this dissertation based on the vertical differentiation approach
and consumer utility theory from economics.
Each consumer consumes one or zero units of a product. The product
is characterized by a quality index q. When there are several qualities in a
product category, we will often talk about these different qualities as being
”different products.” For the moment, let’s focus our attention to the case of
a single quality/product.
A consumer has the following preferences:
U =
{
θq − p if he buys a product with quality q at price p,
0 if he does not buy.
(2.3)
U should be thought of as the utility derived from the consumption of the
10
product. q is a positive real number that describes the quality of the product.
The utility is separable in quality and price. θ, a positive real number, is a
taste parameter, or a valuation for quality parameter by another name. All
consumers prefer high quality, for a given price; however, a consumer with
a high θ is more willing to pay to purchase high quality. We assume that
the taste parameter θ is continuously distributed with PDF, f (θ), and CDF,
F (θ), over the interval [0, 1], where F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1. Thus, F (θ) is
the fraction of consumers with a taste parameter of less than θ.
Alternatively, we can also interpret θ as the inverse of the marginal rate
of substitution between income and quality rather than as a taste parameter.




q − (1/θ) p if he buys a product with quality q at price p,
0 if he does not buy.
(2.4)
On this interpretation, all consumers derive the same utility from the product,
but they have different incomes and, therefore, different marginal rates of
substitution between income and quality (1/θ). Wealthier consumers have a
lower ”marginal utility of income” or, equivalently, a higher θ.
The demand function for the product based on this particular utility
function can be derived as follows. If there is only one product available in
the market, the demand for the product is equal to the number of consumers
who purchase the product. That is, the number of consumers with valuation
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θ such that θq ≥ p. In other words, the demand for the product is
D (p) = N [1 − F (p/q)] , (2.5)
where N is the total number of consumers. In this dissertation, we normalize
the total number of consumers to be N = 1.
If there are several qualities offered in the market, the consumers choose
among these qualities as well as choosing whether to buy at all. We assume
that all consumers have unit demands – i.e., they consume at most one unit
of the product – whatever the quality. Particularly, we consider a product
category with two different qualities. We may consider product categories
with more than two qualities. However, for the ease of exposition, we focus
our attention in this dissertation to categories with two products with qualities
q1 < q2, which are sold at prices p1 < p2.
Consumers with valuation θ will obtain a net utility of θqi − pi from
purchasing product i, i = 1, 2, or 0 from buying nothing. Each consumer will
decide to purchase either product 1, or product 2, or nothing, depending upon
which of these options maximizes his or her net utility. For any 0 ≤ p1 < p2,
the market segmentation can be determined from the individual rationality and
incentive compatibility constraints. Let θi = pi/qi, i = 1, 2. Any consumer
with valuation θ ≥ θ2 prefers buying product 2 to not buying at all. Similarly,
any consumers with valuation θ ≥ θ1 prefers buying product 1 to not buying
at all. Define θ1,2 =
p2−p1
q2−q1 . Consumers with valuation θ ≥ θ1,2 prefer buying
12
product 2 to product 1:
(θq2 − p2) − (θq1 − p1)
= (q2 − q1)
(




when θ ≥ θ1,2.
We have the following properties regarding the three values θ1, θ2, and
θ1,2.






, and θ1,2 =
p2−p1
q2−q1 . We have:
1. If θ1 ≤ θ2 then θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ1,2;
2. If θ2 ≤ θ1 then θ1,2 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ1.
Proof. All proofs are provided in the appendix for the corresponding chapters.
As a consequence of these relationships, the possible values for p1 and
p2 can be divided into three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
regions R1, R2, and R1,2 (the subscript ”1” denotes product 1, ”2” denotes
product 2, and ”1, 2” denotes both products) as follows:
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R1 ≡ {(p1, p2) : p1 ≤ p2 + q1 − q2} ,
R2 ≡
{














Define Q1 (p1, p2) and Q2 (p1, p2) to be the quantities of product 1 and
2 that are sold when the retail prices are p1 and p2. The following result then
follows from applying the standard approach of identifying the valuations of
marginal consumers:
Lemma 2.2.2. For any prices (p1, p2) ∈ R1 ∪R2 ∪R1,2, consumer purchasing
behavior can be characterized as follows:
1. If (p1, p2) ∈ R1, only product 1 experiences positive demand, and Q1 (p1, p2) =
1 − F (θ1).
2. If (p1, p2) ∈ R1,2, both products experience positive demand, and Q1 (p1, p2) =
F (θ1,2) − F (θ1), and Q2 (p1, p2) = 1 − F (θ1,2).
3. If (p1, p2) ∈ R2, only product 2 experiences positive demand, and Q2 (p1, p2) =
1 − F (θ2).
2.3 Distribution of Consumer Valuation
In order to facilitate the analysis of the models under consideration,
we assume that consumer valuations follow a family FK of distributions on
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the interval [0, 1], where K ∈ (0,∞). The CDF and PDF of the distribution
family are characterized by the single parameter K > 0 as follows:
F (θ; K) = 1 − (1 − θ)K and f (θ; K) = K (1 − θ)K−1 , (2.7)
where, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. It is easy to confirm that FK includes the uniform distribu-
tion (K = 1). Thus, our distributional assumption is more general than most
other analytical models of vertically differentiated products, which nearly uni-
versally rely upon the uniform distribution. To our knowledge, FK was first
applied to market segmentation by Debo et al. (2005, [13]), but it has not
been specifically used to study the interaction between vertically differenti-
ated products. As shown in Figure 2.2, which plots the density f (θ; K) and
distribution function F (θ; K) for three different values of K, FK allows us
to consider situations in which the concentration of mass can be either at the
low or the high end of the spectrum. In the figure it is easy to see that: when
K < 1, consumer valuations are concentrated at the high end; when K > 1,
they are concentrated at the low end; and when K = 1, they are uniformly
distributed.
15
Figure 2.1: The linear city.






















































Figure 2.2: (a) f (θ) = K (1 − θ)K−1; (b) F (θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)K for K = 0.5,





Although much attention has been paid to the increase in efficiency
that has occurred in retail channels over the past twenty years, the gains are
typically attributed to either the role of information technology in facilitating
practices such as vendor managed inventory (VMI), collaborative planning
forecasting and replenishment (CPFR), etc. or to the consolidation among
retailers and redesign of store formats, i.e. e-tailing and big-box. One of the
consequences of having fewer, bigger retailers, is that many of them now have
sufficient economies of scale to be able to produce their own private label
products. For example, H-E-B, which operates over 300 grocery stores in
Texas and Mexico, carries more than 3,000 items under the brand names of
Hill Country Fare and H-E-B, and operates its own manufacturing operations
for many of these.1 Once a retailer has developed the capability of producing
its own private label in a category, it has one more alternative to consider
in its assortment, pricing and promotional planning, and this may give it
more leverage with respect to a national brand manufacturer(s). On the other
1H-E-B operates the largest dairy and bakery production facilities in the state of Texas
(http://www.heb.com/aboutHEB/history.jsp).
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hand, because the retailer is self-interested, her decision to develop private
label capability may not necessarily benefit the supply chain as a whole.
In this chapter, we investigate how a retailer’s ability to develop private
label capability affects the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain consist-
ing of a single manufacturer of a national brand and a single retailer. To the
extent that private labels are often perceived to be of lower quality than the
national brands, a retailers development of private label capability is effec-
tively a product line extension. However, the fact that the private label affects
the strategic interactions with the national brand manufacturer is a critical
distinction between this product line decision and the traditional one that has
been studied by Mussa and Rosen (1978, [34]), Moorthy (1984, [31]), Moorthy
and Png (1992, [32]), Desai (2001, [16]), among others, where the costs of var-
ious product offerings are assumed to be exogenous. While this assumption
is reasonable in situations where a firm produces all of the potential product
varieties itself, it does not capture the way a retailers private label capability af-
fects her strategic interaction with the manufacturer of the national brand. As
has been recognized in the analytical results of Mills (1995, [30]), Narasimhan
and Wilcox (1998, [35]), Groznik and Heese (2007, [17]) and confirmed in the
empirical studies of Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004, [38]), among others: the
introduction of a private label can help to mitigate double marginalization
for the national brand. On the other hand, there may be fixed costs asso-
ciated with the development of private label capability. Consequently, while
a private label product may improve a retailers ability to obtain favorable
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wholesale prices from a national brand manufacturer, it may not represent an
efficient product line extension for the category. This trade-off is somewhat
similar to the one studied in Villas-Boas (1998, [51]), but in that analysis the
retailer has no ability to produce internally, and instead chooses her product
line assortment from among the products offered by the manufacturer.
In the literature, a number of studies have demonstrated how private
labels that are perceived to be of lower quality than national brands can miti-
gate double marginalization in situations in which the private label represents
a form of low end vertical differentiation from the national brand. Both Mills
(1995, [30]) and Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998, [35]) consider models that
demonstrate how the introduction of a low end private label that is produced
by the retailer can mitigate double marginalization with respect to a national
brand product. Bontems et al. (1999, [6]) also consider the introduction of a
low end private label, and allow the quality level of the private label to be con-
trolled by the retailer. They assume that consumer valuations are uniformly
distributed and that marginal costs are quadratic in the quality of the prod-
uct, and focus on two opposing effects that increased private label quality can
have upon the wholesale price of the national brand: As private label quality
increases, it becomes a better substitute for the national brand, but at the
same time, the corresponding increase in marginal costs makes the national
brand manufacturer less willing to sacrifice his own margin in order to drive
the private label out of the market. Although the manuscript does not con-
sider the product line that would be chosen by a vertically integrated supply
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chain, the assumption of quadratic costs suggests that it would include a low
end product for a wide range of cost parameters.
Several other studies have considered forms of product differentiation
other than vertical. For example, Raju et al. (1995, [40]) use an aggregate de-
mand model to demonstrate that a retailer benefits most from the introduction
of a private label when the cross price elasticity between the private label and
national brands is high and the cross price elasticities among national brands
are low. Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004, [33]) allow for horizontal differentia-
tion by modeling two segments of consumers, and they represent the private
label as being a low end substitute for the national brands that are offered to
each of these segments. They argue that the retailer benefits more from an in-
ternally produced private label than from one produced by the national brand
manufacturers since it gives the retailer control over its positioning. However,
they allow for non-linear contracts that assure that the total channel profit is
equal to the first-best profit, and focus on how the private label affects the al-
location of channel profit rather than on how it affects the total profit earned
by the channel. At least two other papers have modeled the positioning of
private label products, e.g. Sayman et al. (2002, [42]) and Choi and Coughlan
(2006, [11]), with respect to two partially differentiated national brands.
There has also been a large amount of empirical research devoted to
private label products. Those most relevant to our work are the investigations
of Ailawadi and Harlam (2004, [1]), and Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004, [38]),
both of which focus on how the introduction of a private label affects retail
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margins and profits within a category. A very nice history of private label
products and review of the literature can be found in Steiner (2004, [44]).
The main contribution of our work is to recognize the interaction be-
tween two opposing effects of private label development in a decentralized
supply chain: On one hand, the retailer’s self-interest causes her to introduce
private label products that would not be included in the first-best product
line for the category. Yet on the other hand, because the development of these
inefficient private labels helps to mitigate double marginalization, they can
either increase or decrease the total supply chain profit. Our analysis provides
insights about how and when the development of a structurally inefficient pri-
vate label can in fact be beneficial for a supply chain. In an extension to
our base model, we allow for the retailer to exert promotional effort to influ-
ence the extent to which consumers are exposed to the private label and the
national brand. In this analysis, we demonstrate conditions under which the
retailer’s ability to promote can be either a strategic complement or a strategic
substitute for private label capability.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we de-
scribe the key elements of our base model and also characterize the first best
(vertically integrated) solution. In Section 3.3, we model the private label de-
velopment as a three-stage game in which the retailer first determines whether
to develop private label capability, the manufacturer responds with a wholesale
price for the national brand, and the retailer responds by setting retail prices.
Based on this analysis, we are able to assess how the retailer’s opportunity
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to develop a private label affects the supply chain profit and determine the
conditions for which this can be either beneficial or harmful. In Section 3.4
we consider an extension to our basic model in which the retailer can influ-
ence the rate at which consumers are exposed to specific products by exerting
promotional effort. The main purpose of this extension is to demonstrate that
promotional effort and private label development can be either strategic sub-
stitutes or strategic complements. Section 3.5 provides a brief summary and
discussion of the implications of our analysis.
3.2 The Base Model
Consider a supply chain that consists of one manufacturer of a na-
tional brand and a single retailer. We adopt the convention of using feminine
pronouns for the retailer and masculine pronouns for the manufacturer. In
addition, we will henceforth refer to the manufacturer of the national brand
as the manufacturer.
We consider a product category in which the retailer has the opportu-
nity to develop her own private label product. As is often the case in practice,
we assume that the private label product is perceived to be of a lower level
of quality than the national brand. This assumption is consistent with those
of Mills (1995, [30]), Raju et al. (1995, [40]), and Narasimhan and Wilcox
(1998, [35]), among others. Let q denote the exogenous perceived level of
quality for the private label product relative to the national brand. Specifi-
cally, we assume that the quality of the national brand is equal to one and that
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0 < q < 1. This is a special case of the demand model presented in Chapter 2
with γ1 = q and γ2 = 1. In order to be able to credibly threaten to sell a pri-
vate label, the retailer must incur a fixed development cost, which we denote
by g. This may include both the costs of product development as well as the
reservation of the capacity. For example, for H-E-B to offer its private label
dairy products, it had to incur some fixed costs for determining product speci-
fications, designing packaging, etc., and it also incurs fixed costs for operating
its own dairy facilities. In other settings, the national brand manufacturers
also produce and supply private label products to retailers. However, such
situations give rise to a different set of strategic interactions than those that
we seek to address.
Let C and c be the marginal production cost for the national brand and
for the retailer’s private label respectively. Although other investigations of
private label products, e.g. Raju et al. (1995, [40]), normalize the production
costs of both the national brand and the private label to zero, we explicitly
consider positive production costs to explore the implications of the relative
cost difference between the manufacturer and the retailer.
We use the notation n to denote the national brand and p the private
label. Thus, product n is corresponding to product 2 and product p corre-
sponding to product 1 in our previous discussion. Similarly, we change the
notation θ1 to θp, θ2 to θn, and θ1,2 to θnp. The demand thus can be obtained
from Lemma 2.2.2 accordingly. The distribution of consumer valuation θ is
specified in Section 2.3.
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We assume that the production costs, C and c, of the national brand
and the private label as well as the perceived quality level of the private label,
q, are common knowledge to both the manufacturer and the retailer.
The interactions between the manufacturer and the retailer are repre-
sented as a three-stage game. In the first stage, the retailer decides whether
to develop private label capability. If she decides to develop the private label,
she incurs a fixed cost g. Let d ∈ {0, 1} denote the retailer’s decision. If d = 0,
she does not develop the capability, while if d = 1, she does. In the second
stage, the manufacturer observes the retailer’s development decision d and sets
a wholesale price w for the national brand. Finally, in stage three, the retailer
responds to the wholesale price w by setting retail prices pn and pp for the
national brand and the private label, respectively. Then, the demand for each
product carried by the retailer is realized and profits are collected. Figure 3.1
summarizes the sequence of events in this base setting, and Figure 3.2 depicts
the relationship between the two sub-games: d = 0, and d = 1.
The manufacturer’s profit can be represented as:
Π (w, pn, pp) = Qn (pn, pp) (w − C) , (3.1)
Recall that by taking pp ≥ q, we can represent the case where the retailer sells
only the national brand. Of course, if the retailer sells only the private label,
the manufacturer’s profit is zero. For the retailer, we define:
π (w, pn, pp) = Qn (pn, pp) (pn −w) + Qp (pn, pp) (pp − c) . (3.2)
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The function π (w, pn, pp) represents the retailer’s net income, i.e. rev-
enue minus cost of goods sold but excluding any fixed costs. After adjusting
the net income to account for fixed costs, the retailer’s profit can be written
as:
π̄ (d, w, pn, pp) =
{
π (w, pn, q) , if d = 0;
π (w, pn, pp) − g, if d = 1;
(3.3)
Before we analyze the above three-stage game, let us obtain the first-
best solution as a benchmark. This is equivalent to considering the perspective
of a vertically integrated supply chain that already has the capability of pro-
ducing a “national brand”, and must decide whether to develop a product line
extension (private label). In order to examine this, it is useful to introduce
the following definition as a means of measuring the efficiency of the private
label relative to the national brand:
Definition 3.2.1. The Ratio of Potential Margin (RPM), defined as q−c
1−C ,
represents the ratio between the maximum per-unit margin that could be
earned from selling the private label versus that for the national brand.
Recall that the quality of the national brand is equal to one and that the
maximum valuation per-unit-of-quality among consumers is θ = 1. Thus, the
highest profit margin of the national brand is equal to 1−C , where C is the per
unit production cost of the national brand. Similarly, the highest profit margin
of the private label is equal to q − c. As a measure of the relative efficiency of
the private label, RPM is useful in characterizing the conditions under which
a product line extension (private label) will be included in either a vertically
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integrated or a decentralized supply chain. As shown in the following theorem,
the larger the value of RPM, the more attractive the private label becomes to
a vertically integrated supply chain as either a product line extension or as a
replacement for the national brand.
Theorem 3.2.1. The optimal (first-best) solution to the problem of private
label development and pricing for the vertically integrated supply chain can be
characterized as follows:2
1. When RPM ≤ q, then for any development cost g, dFB = 0, the private




2. When q < RPM < 1, there exists a threshold value ĝb > 0, such that, if
and only if g < ĝb, d
FB = 1, the private label is developed, and pFBn =
1+KC
1+K
, and pFBp =
q+Kc
1+K





3. When RPM ≥ 1, there exists a threshold value ĝp > 0, such that, if
and only if g < ĝp, then d




while the national brand is not sold. Otherwise, dFB = 0,




Furthermore, the threshold values ĝb and ĝp are both decreasing in c and in-
creasing in C.
2For those cases in which the private label (national brand) is not sold, the vertically




is an optimal solution, even though it is not unique.
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When we have RPM ≤ q, the vertically integrated supply chain does
not develop the private label regardless of g. When RPM > q, then the
integrated supply chain develops the private label only if the fixed development
cost, g, is not too high. Note that, for q < RPM < 1, if the private label
is developed, it serves as a product line extension and is sold along side the
national brand. However, when RPM ≥ 1, if the private label is developed,
it serves as a replacement for the national brand. In those cases for which the
first best solution would not include the private label, i.e. when dFB = 0, we
say that the private label would be a structurally inefficient addition to the
product line.
3.3 Analysis of the Base Model
Our analysis of the three-stage game that is played in the decentralized
supply chain follows the standard approach of backward induction. In section
3.3.1, we derive the outcomes that follow the retailer’s decision to not develop
the private label capability (the sub-game d = 0). In section 3.3.2, we derive
the corresponding outcomes that follow the retailer’s decision to obtain the
private label capability (the sub-game d = 1). In section 3.3.3, we characterize
the retailer’s development decision and briefly discuss how this decision might
affect the supplier’s incentive to reduce his own marginal costs. Finally, in
Section 3.3.4, we investigate the impact of the private label on the supply
chain profit.
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3.3.1 Lack of Private Label Capability
In the sub-game (d = 0) in which the retailer has no private label
capability, the interaction between the national brand manufacturer and the
retailer reduces to a classic bilateral monopoly in which the manufacturer acts
as a Stackelberg leader. For any wholesale price w, the retailer chooses a retail




π (w, pn, q) = Qn (pn, q) (pn − w) . (3.4)
Solving problem (3.4) yields the retailer’s best response retail price for the





where the superscript 0 indicates that this optimal response is conditional
upon d = 0, and K is the parameter of the distribution family for consumer
valuation.
Anticipating the retailer’s best response retail price in (3.5), the manu-
facturer sets the wholesale price w he will charge the retailer so as to maximize









p0n (w) , q
)
(w −C) . (3.6)
Performing the maximization in (3.6) yields the wholesale price at which the
manufacturer will sell the national brand to the retailer under the case in
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The superscript N (N ational brand only) signifies the equilibrium outcome of
the sub-game d = 0. By substituting the profit-maximizing wholesale price
from (3.7) into the expression for the retailer’s best response retail price in
(3.5) , we can otain the equilibrium retail price and quantity for the national
brand:
pNn = 1 −








Substituting the wholesale price from (3.7) and the retailer’s best response
retail price from (3.8) into (3.6) and (3.4) reveals that, in the absence of

















The equilibrium net income3 for the supply chain of the sub-game d = 0,









Theorem 3.3.1. When the retailer has no private label capability in a category
(the sub-game d = 0):
3We use the term “net income” to highlight the fact that this expression does not include
fixed costs. When d = 0, there are no fixed costs and net income is equal to profit, but the
two differ when d = 1.
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1. The equilibrium wholesale price wN and the retail price pNn are increasing
in the unit cost C of the national brand and decreasing in the distribution
parameter K.
2. The equilibrium sales quantity QNn for the national brand is decreasing in
both the unit cost C of the national brand and the distribution parameter
K.
3. The manufacturer’s profit ΠN , the retailer’s profit πN , and the supply
chain profit ΠNSC are all decreasing in both the unit cost C of the national
brand and the distribution parameter K.
Recall that when the parameter K increases, the mass of the distri-
bution shifts away from high-valuations toward low-valuations. As the mass
shifts, both the manufacturer and the retailer are more willing to sacrifice mar-
gins on the high valuation consumers to go after a dense set of low valuation
consumers. The profits are decreasing because the low-valuation consumers
are less valuable than those high valuation consumers due to the same reason.
3.3.2 A Private Label in the Category
In this section, we study the equilibrium of the sub-game d = 1. Once
the retailer has incurred (sunk) the fixed cost to obtain private label capability,
she has more options available to her in responding to the manufacturer’s
wholesale price. Depending on the prices she sets, she can sell only the national





π (w, pn, pp) . (3.11)
Let p1n(w) and p
1
p(w) be the retailer’s optimal response conditional upon her
having private label capability, i.e. d = 1.
Lemma 3.3.2. The retailer’s best response to wholesale price w for the na-
tional brand can be characterized as follows:
1. If 0 ≤ w ≤ c
q
, the retailer sets p1n (w) =
1+Kw
1+K
and p1p (w) = q, and she
does not sell any private label.
2. If c
q
< w < 1 + c − q, the retailer sets p1n (w) = 1+Kw1+K and p1p (w) =
q+Kc
1+K
and she sells both the national brand and the private label.
3. If 1+ c− q ≤ w ≤ 1, the retailer sets p1n (w) = 1 and p1p (w) = q+Kc1+K , and
she does not sell any national brand.
When the private label (national brand) is not sold, the retailer’s profits are
maximized for any pp ≥ qp1n (w)
(
pn ≥ p1p (w) + 1 − q
)
. Thus, for these cases,
p1p = q (p
1
n = 1) is an optimal solution, even though it is not unique.
In anticipation of the above retailer pricing response, the manufacturer










Denote by wB the equilibrium wholesale price for the sub-game d = 1. The
superscript B signifies that the retailer has the capability to sell both products.
31












to be the equilibrium prices,












to be the equilibrium
quantities for this sub-game.
Theorem 3.3.3. The equilibrium of the sub-game d = 1 can be characterized
according to the following four mutually exclusive intervals for the RPM (which
is defined as RPM = q−c

















; and d) P ≡ [1, +∞):
1. When RPM ∈ N , we have wB = 1+KC
1+K








and the private label is not sold.










and the private label is not sold.
3. When RPM ∈ NPH, we have wB = 1+KC−q+c
1+K























4. When RPM ∈ P , the retailer will not sell the national brand in response









the national brand is not sold.
The ranges for the RPM are plotted against the quality level q of the
private label in Figure 3.3. The above result generalizes the one obtained
by Mills (1995, [30]) by allowing for a more general distribution of consumer
valuations and marginal costs for both the private label and national brand.
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When the RPM is low, i.e. RPM ≤ Kq
1+K
, the equilibrium wholesale price
is independent of c, i.e. the private label has no effect upon the strategic
interactions between the national brand manufacturer and the retailer. At the
other extreme, in region P , the private label is so efficient that the retailer
cannot be induced to sell the national brand at any wholesale price above
the manufacturer’s marginal cost. For the two intermediate regions, there
are two possibilities: In region NPM , the retailer’s private label capability
causes the manufacturer to reduce his wholesale price by enough to make his
national brand sufficiently attractive to the retailer that she sells none of her
private label. Notice, that in this region, the wholesale price is independent
of the manufacturer’s marginal cost C . In region NPH, the retailer’s private
label capability still puts pressure on the manufacturer to reduce his wholesale
price, but not by enough to discourage the retailer from selling any units of
her private label. In this region, the equilibrium wholesale price depends upon
both C and c, reflecting the manufacturer’s trade-off between reducing his
margin in return for reducing the retailer’s substitution of sales of her own
private label for sales of the national brand. Consequently, both products are
sold in region NPH.
From Theorem 3.2.1, the integrated supply chain will not sell the struc-
turally inefficient private label when RPM ≤ q for any fixed development
cost g. Since the lower limit of set NPH is Kq
1+K−q < q, the retailer may, for
sufficiently small values of g, sell the private label even if it is structurally
inefficient. Moreover, since the retailer can benefit from lower wholesale prices
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by developing a private label for even lower levels of RPM ∈ NPM , there
may be a wide range of parameters for which the retailer incurs the fixed cost
to develop a structurally inefficient private label.
Substituting the equilibrium wholesale price and retail prices into (3.11)
and (3.12), we have the equilibrium profits of the manufacturer, ΠB, and the
net income of the retailer and of the supply chain, πB and ΠBSC respectively,
in the sub-game d = 1. The equilibrium is summarized in Table 3.1.
Corollary 3.3.4. The equilibrium of the sub-game d = 1 has the following
properties:
1. Both the wholesale price wB and the retail price pBn of the national brand
are increasing in C and c, and decreasing in q and K.
2. The retail price of the private label pBp is increasing in q and c, and
decreasing in K.
3. The manufacturer’s profit ΠB, the retailer’s net income πB, and the
supply chain’s net income ΠBSC are all decreasing in C.
From our result in Theorem 3.3.3, we can also see how the distribution
of consumer valuations affects the strategic role of the private label. Note
that both the threshold, Kq
1+K
, that separates low RPM from intermediate,
and Kq
1+K−q , that separates intermediate RPM from high, depend on K, the
parameter of the family FK of distribution functions.
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Corollary 3.3.5. Both of the thresholds, Kq
1+K
, and Kq
1+K−q , are increasing in
K.
As K increases, shifting the concentration of mass toward lower val-
uations, the retailer’s private label must have higher RPM in order to play
a strategic role. Although this is a somewhat counter-intuitive result, it is
driven by the fact that, when consumers become increasingly concentrated at
the low end, the manufacturer will try to pursue them by decreasing his own
margin, even in the absence of a private label. Consequently, the private label
becomes less attractive to the retailer as a partial substitute for the national
brand. In the following Theorem, we make some comparisons between the two
pricing sub-games, with and without the private label. Let us define QNn and
QBn as the equilibrium sales quantities of the national brand when d = 0 and
when d = 1 respectively.
Theorem 3.3.6. Comparing the equilibrium of the sub-game d = 1 to that of
the sub-game d = 0, we have the following results:
1. The manufacturer charges a lower wholesale price: wB ≤ wN .






, such that QBn < Q
N
n when 0 ≤ c < cQ and
QBn ≥ QNn otherwise.
3. The manufacturer achieves a lower profit: ΠB ≤ ΠN ; The retailer and
supply chain achieves higher net incomes: πB ≥ πN and ΠBSC ≥ ΠNSC ;
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The increase in the retailer’s net income is higher than that of the supply
chain: πB −πN ≥ ΠBSC −ΠNSC. In addition, the inequalities are all strict
when c < 1+KC
1+K
q.
The result that the private label provides the retailer with additional
leverage that can drive down the manufacturer’s wholesale price is both intu-
itive and consistent with the existing results of Mills (1995, [30]), Bontems et
al. (1999, [6]), etc., that were obtained for somewhat different assumptions.
However, our result has several unique features: First, it captures the way in
which marginal production costs and the relative quality of the private label
affect the output quantities and the net income / profits. Second, it is explicit
in recognizing that the retailer’s development of private label capability does
not necessarily decrease the sales volume of the national brand. Specifically,
when RPM ∈ NPM , the private label capability serves only to provide the
retailer with a credible threat to sell the private label. In this region, private
label capability encourages the manufacturer to reduce his wholesale price,
mitigating double marginalization, yet it does not create any adverse canni-
balization effects. Only at higher levels of RPM does the sales quantity of the
national brand decrease as a consequence of the retailer’s private label capa-
bility. Finally, it highlights the fact that the net income of the supply chain
increases as a result of the retailer’s private label capability.
It is of interest to compare the result in part 3 of Theorem 3.3.6 with
our earlier result from Theorem 3.2.1 regarding the structural efficiency of the
private label. From the earlier result, we know that for any development cost
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g, the private label would be structurally inefficient when RPM < q, which






, in spite of
the fact that the private label would be structurally inefficient for all values of
g, it would nevertheless increase the total net income of the supply chain. It
follows that for small enough development costs, the development of private
label capability in such situations could still be a net benefit to the supply
chain.
The development of a private label has two opposing effects on the
performance of the supply chain: On one hand, the introduction of the pri-
vate label creates pressure upon the manufacturer to reduce his wholesale
price, mitigating double marginalization; On the other hand, the private label
involves additional development costs and may cannibalize demand for the na-
tional brand. In the next section we characterize the conditions under which
this trade-off helps to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.
3.3.3 Private Label Development Decision
The retailer’s optimal decision on private label capability development
and the impact of the private label on the supply chain both depend on the
value of the fixed development cost g. Let us define ∆R = πB−πN and ∆SC =
ΠBSC−ΠNSC . ∆R (∆SC) represents the increase in the retailer’s (supply chain’s)
net income as a result of the retailer’s developing private label capability.
Obviously, the retailer develops the private label capability if and only if ∆R ≥
g.
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Theorem 3.3.7. The optimal solution to the problem of private label devel-
opment and pricing for the retailer can be characterized as follows:
1. When RPM ∈ N , then the private label is not developed (d∗ = 0) re-
gardless of development cost g. The manufacturer sets a wholesale price
w∗ = 1+KC
1+K




2. When RPM ∈ NPM , there exists a threshold value ḡn > 0, such that,
if and only if g < ḡn, then the private label is developed (d
∗ = 1), but
it is not sold in equilibrium where w∗ = c
q










3. When RPM ∈ NPH, there exists a threshold value ḡb > 0, such that, if
and only if g < ḡb, then the private label is developed (d
∗ = 1), and the
prices are: w∗ = 1+KC−q+c
1+K
, p∗n = 1 − K
2(1−C)+K(q−c)
1(1+K)2




Otherwise, it is not developed (d∗ = 0), and the prices are w∗ = 1+KC
1+K




4. When RPM ∈ P , there exists a threshold value ḡp > 0, such that, if
and only if g < ḡp, then the private label is developed (d
∗ = 1) and the
retailer sells only the private label at price p∗p =
q+Kc
1+K
. Otherwise, it is not
developed (d∗ = 0), and the prices are w∗ = 1+KC
1+K




As before, when the private label (national brand) is not sold, it would not
be sold for any pp ≥ qp∗n
(
pn ≥ p∗p + 1 − q
)
. Thus, for these cases, p∗p = q
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(p∗n = 1) are equilibrium values.
The above results characterize the retailer’s optimal strategy of devel-
oping private label capability and pricing of products. Recall from Theorem
3.2.1 that the first best solution will never include the private label when
RPM < q. However, because Kq
1+K−q < q < 1 implies that q ∈ NPH, this
is not the case for the decentralized supply chain. At small enough fixed de-
velopment costs, the decentralized supply chain will include the private label
even when RPM < q.
From the results presented in Theorem 3.3.7, we can get some insight as
to how the development of the private label might affect the incentive for the
national brand manufacturer to undertake efforts to reduce his own marginal
cost for production and distribution. Recall that, when the retailer lacks
private label capability, the manufacturer’s profit is ΠN , as shown in (3.9). In
order to ensure that the manufacturer’s profit is concave in C , we will restrict
our attention to K ≤ 1. Differentiating with respect to C , we can see that the









On the other hand, if the retailer does have private label capability, then as
shown in Theorem 3.3.7, there are several different possibilities: Using the
expressions that are shown in Table 1 for the manufacturer’s profit when the
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for RPM ∈ NPH
0 otherwise
(3.14)
1) If the manufacturer’s cost, C , without the private label is already low
enough relative to the quality and cost of the private label that we would have
RPM ∈ N , then the development would obviously have no effect upon his
incentive to further reduce cost. 2) If the manufacturer’s cost, C , without
the private label would result in RPM ∈ NPM , then the development of
the private label would unequivocally increase the manufacturer’s incentive
to reduce his costs. To see that this is the case, it is easy to see that the
absolute value of the upper branch of (3.14) is larger than that for (3.13)
so long as RPM > qK
1+K
, which is a necessary condition to have RPM ∈
NPM . In this range, the private label reduces double marginalization without
cannibalizing the manufacturer’s demand. Because this results in a larger
volume of output for the manufacturer, it increases his incentive to reduce
costs. 3) If the manufacturer’s cost, C , without the private label would result
in RPM ∈ NPH ∪ P , then the private label may either increase or decrease
the manufacturer’s incentive to reduce his costs. By comparing the absolute
value of the middle branch of (3.14) to that for (3.13), it is easy to see that when
RPM ∈ NPH, private label weakens the manufacturer’s marginal benefit
from cost reduction so long as 1−q−(C−c)
1−q < 1, which is true so long as C >
c. When RPM ∈ P , it is obvious that the private label would reduce the
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manufacturer’s marginal benefit from cost reduction to zero. Thus, when
RPM ∈ NPH ∪ P , the private label will clearly decrease the manufacturer’s
marginal incentive to reduce his costs because of the fact that, in this range, the
private label is cannibalizing some or all of the demand for the national brand.
On the other hand, it may be possible that in this range, the development
of the private label would induce the manufacturer to undertake a dramatic
reduction in variable costs in order to enable himself to shift the equilibrium
into a more favorable range of RPM .
3.3.4 Impact on Supply Chain Profit
To make a formal comparison between the effect of the private label
upon decentralized supply chain profit versus its effect upon the vertically
integrated profit, let us define ∆V I to be the amount by which the vertically
integrated supply chain profit would increase if it had the option to produce a
product of quality q at marginal cost c given that it already has the capability
of producing a product of quality equal to one at marginal cost C .
Theorem 3.3.8. For all parameters (K, C, c, and q), ∆R ≥ ∆V I. Thus, if
the private label is structurally efficient, i.e. ∆V I ≥ g, then the retailer will
always develop private label capability, but she may also develop the capability
to produce some structurally inefficient private labels.
Obviously, the retailer develops the private label only when it is in her
best interest to do so, i.e. ∆R ≥ g. For the supply chain to benefit from
the development of private label capability, we additionally need ∆SC ≥ g.
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From part c of Theorem 3.3.6, we know that ∆R ≥ ∆SC, which implies that
the development of these private labels may or may not be beneficial to the
supply chain. However, it is important to note the distinction between ∆SC
and ∆V I : While both are measures of the impact of the private label upon
the net income of the total supply chain, ∆SC assumes that prices are set in
a decentralized fashion, i.e. the manufacturer sets a wholesale price for the
national brand and the retailer responds with retail prices for both the national
brand and the private label. In contrast, ∆V I assumes that the supply chain is
vertically integrated so that there is no need for a wholesale price. Because of
this distinction, it is quite possible that a structurally inefficient private label,
i.e. one for which ∆V I < g, could nevertheless have a beneficial effect upon
the performance of the decentralized supply chain, i.e. ∆SC ≥ g.
In Figure 3.4, we illustrate the conditions under which the decentralized
supply chain will include the private label as a product line extension when the
first-best solution would not. In the figure, we show the threshold development
cost (ḡ ) below which the private label would be developed in the decentralized
supply chain under several different sets of parameters. We compare this
threshold to both ∆SC, the increase in the net income of the decentralized
supply chain, and to ĝ the threshold development cost below which the first-
best solution would include the private label.4 In Figures 3.4a - 3.4c, we take
q = 0.6, C = 0.5, and allow c to vary between 0 and q = 0.6. To investigate the
4Recall from Theorem 3.2.1 that the threshold development costs below which the private
label is included in the first-best solution is either ĝb or ĝp, depending upon the value of
RPM . In the figures, we adopt the un-subscripted, ĝ, to represent both of these.
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sensitivity to the distribution of consumer valuations, we consider: K = 0.5
(concentration of mass at high valuations), K = 1 (uniform distribution), and
K = 2 (concentration of mass at the low valuations). In comparing the plots
for different values of K, it is important to recognize that the scale of the
vertical-axes varies in order to best highlight the different regions for each set
of parameters. Figures 3.4d - 3.4f are similar, but here we hold the retailer’s
cost constant at c = 0.4, and allow the manufacturer’s cost C to vary between
0 and 1.
In all six of the figures, we have labeled four different regions. Regions
I and IV represent two extremes. Region I is the only region in which the
decentralized retailer would not develop private label capability, and region
IV is the only region in which the the private label is structurally efficient,
and would be included as a product line extension in the first best solution. In
both of the intermediate regions, II and III , the private label is structurally
inefficient, but would be developed in the decentralized supply chain. In region
III , the development of the structurally inefficient private label would never-
theless result in an increase in the total decentralized supply chain profits. In
this region, the private label’s ability to mitigate double marginalization more
than compensates for its fixed costs and cannibalization of the demand for
the national brand. By developing the private label, the retailer gains more
than the manufacturer loses. On the other hand, in region II , the retailer also
benefits from developing the capability to produce a structurally inefficient pri-
vate label, but in this region, she gains less than the manufacturer loses, and
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the development of the private label adversely affects the total decentralized
supply chain profits.
It is also of some interest to observe how the shape of these regions
changes in response to the parameters. First, we can see that as K increases,
i.e. shifting the concentration of consumer valuations toward the low end,
region I expands, primarily due to the shrinkage of regions II and III , so that
the private label is developed for a smaller set of parameters. This suggests
that private labels may be least effective in product categories in which only
a very small number of consumers have high valuations, whereas they may be
most effective in categories for which relatively few consumers have very low
valuations.
It is also of interest to observe the sensitivity with respect to the
marginal production costs. Recall from Theorem 3.2.1 that the threshold
development cost (ĝb or ĝp), below which the first-best solution includes the
private label, is decreasing in the cost c of the private label and is increasing
in the cost C of the national brand. This is quite intuitive since from the
perspective of a vertically integrated supply chain, the product line extension
is most attractive when its marginal cost is low relative to that of the original
(national brand) product. However, in the decentralized supply chain, the
thresholds are not necessarily monotone in c and C . In Figures 3.4a - 3.4c, we
can see that although the retailer’s development cost threshold, ḡ, is monotone
decreasing in c, the threshold, ∆SC, below which the supply chain benefits is
not. It first decreases, then increases, before decreasing again. (The increase
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is subtle, but we can show this analytically.) The reason for the slight increase
can be explained in terms of the trade-off between double marginalization and
cannibalization. At the point where ∆SC attains a local minimum, the ratio
of cost to quality for the private label is equal to that of the national brand,
so that the retailer is very willing to substitute her own private label for the
national brand. In this region, a small increase in the retailer’s cost causes her
to substitute less of the increasingly inefficient private label.
The lack of monotonicity with respect to the manufacturer’s cost, C , is
much more dramatic. In figures 3.4d - 3.4f, we can see that once the thresholds
ḡ and ∆SC begin to take positive values, they both are first increasing, then
decreasing, and then increasing in C . The reason for this can be explained as
follows: When the thresholds initially become positive, the cost of the national
brand, C , is still low enough that the only role played by the private label is
to provide the retailer with leverage to cause the manufacturer to reduce his
wholesale price. Since the retailer does not actually sell her private label at
these values of C , its only role is to mitigate double marginalization. As C in-
creases, the private label becomes an increasingly attractive substitute for the
national brand. At first, in the region for which ḡ and ∆SC are still increasing,
this serves only to put stronger pressure on the manufacturer’s wholesale price.
However, at the point at which ḡ and ∆SC attain a local maximum (at roughly
C = 0.4, C = 0.52, and C = 0.6 in figures 3.4d, 3.4e, and 3.4f respectively),
the manufacturer is no longer willing to set his wholesale price low enough to
completely discourage sales of the private label. Beyond this point, the re-
45
tailer begins to substitute small amounts of her private label for the national
brand, even though it is initially structurally inefficient. As a consequence
of the retailer’s substitution of a structurally inefficient private label for the
national brand, the net income of both the retailer and the supply chain then
decrease in C until they attain local minima at approximately the point at
which the private label becomes structurally efficient, i.e. where ĝ becomes
positive. Beyond this point of local minima, the private label becomes an
increasingly attractive substitute for the national brand, eventually becoming
the only product that is sold, even by the vertically integrated supply chain.
3.4 Retailer’s Promotional Effects
Thus far, our analysis has focused on the strategic role that private la-
bel development can play in the interactions between a retailer and a national
brand manufacturer, and we have characterized the conditions under which
this role can be either beneficial or detrimental to the total profits of the de-
centralized supply chain. To highlight the role of the private label, we have
considered it as the retailer’s only strategic lever with respect to the manufac-
turer. However, in practice, a retailer’s ability to direct her promotional effort
may be another important strategic lever.
Within the literature on private label products, relatively little atten-
tion has been paid to the effect of either retailer or manufacturer initiated
demand stimulation. Soberman and Parker (2006, [43]) consider the effect of
national brand advertising, but to our knowledge no one has considered a re-
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tailer’s ability to influence retail demand and its implications for private label
introduction.
Outside of the private label literature, a number of papers, e.g. Tsay
and Agrawal (2000, [48]); Taylor (2002, [46]); Krishnan et al. (2004, [24]);
Iyer et al. (2005, [21]); Xia and Gilbert (2007, [52]), etc., have allowed for
retailer effort that stimulates demand for a product that is obtained from a
manufacturer. However, none of these have allowed for the retailer having
the ability to offer her own low end version of the product. In this section,
we extend our original model in order to analyze the interactions between a
retailer’s development of a private label and her ability to influence the demand
for a product via promotional effort.
In modeling these interactions, we want to capture several important
operational dynamics of promotional effort at the retail level. First, we want
to capture the fact that much of a retailer’s in-store promotional effort is aimed
at influencing which products a consumer is exposed to once he or she enters
the store. For example, by positioning a product at the end of an aisle or
by allocating additional shelf space to a product, a retailer can ensure that
a larger portion of all consumers in the store will be exposed to it. These
activities can be particularly effective for products that are impulse purchases,
for which the consumer makes the decision to purchase after entering the store.
A second dynamic that we want to capture is the fact that although a retailer
may direct her promotional effort disproportionately among the products in
a category, there may be spillover effects. For example, once a retailer gets a
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consumer to notice one product in a category, it may be relatively easier for
her to get that consumer to notice other products in the category. Finally,
we want to capture the fact that promotional effort tends to have diminishing
returns so that continuing to increase promotional effort results in smaller and
smaller incremental increases in consumer exposure.
To capture these dynamics, we assume that there is some base num-
ber (normalized to one) of consumers who would be exposed to the product
category even in the absence of any promotional effort on the part of the re-
tailer. However, by exerting promotional effort, the retailer can expand the
number of consumers who are exposed to the product by some percentage. Let
x and y denote the percentage increase in consumer exposure received by the
national brand and the private label as a result of the retailer’s promotional
effort, where x and y can be different. When x = y, the retailer promotes
the whole category and the number of consumers who will be exposed to both
products increases to 1 + x. When x < y, the retailer promotes the private
label more than the national brand. The number of consumers who will be
exposed to both products increases to 1 + x, and y − x additional consumers
will be exposed to the private label only. Similarly, when x > y, the number of
consumers who will be exposed to both products becomes 1 + y and an addi-
tional x− y will be exposed to the national brand only. The cost of increasing
the consumer exposure levels by x and y is represented as follows:
C (x, y) =
1
2
ra (min {x, y})2 + 1
2
a (max {x, y})2 , (3.15)
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where, a > 0 and 0 < r < 1. The parameter a reflects the difficulty of increas-
ing consumer exposure to products in a category. Larger values of a indicate
that it is more difficult to increase sales in a category through increased con-
sumer exposure. The parameter r reflects the extent of promotional synergies
due to spillover effects. When r = 0, we have free-riding in the sense that, once
a group of consumers has been exposed to one product in a category, there is
no additional cost for exposing them to a second product. When r = 1, we
have the opposite extreme of no promotional synergies due to spillover effects.
For this case, the promotion of the two products are completely independent.
For intermediate values of r there are varying degrees of spill-over synergies.
For these cases, once a consumer is exposed to one product in the category, it
is cheaper, but not costless, to get him or her to notice another product.
To facilitate analysis, we assume that the distribution of valuations
among the additional consumers (x and y) is identical to that for the original
base set of consumers. While we admit that this is somewhat restrictive, it
may not be unreasonable for products that are impulse purchases or for which
consumers purchase them regularly but not every time they visit the store.
When we include promotional effects as described above, the retailer’s
profit is separable in pricing and promotion. This is a consequence of our im-
plicit assumption that the additional consumers who are exposed to a product
as a result of promotional activity have the same distribution of valuations as
do the base set of consumers who would have been exposed to it without any
promotion.
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As a result of this separability, the first best solution, i.e. what a
vertically integrated supply chain would do, has some similarity to the first best
solution for our original model. Specifically, the vertically integrated supply
chain would not develop a private label when RPM < q, regardless of how
low the development cost was. However, for q < RPM < 1 the promotional
effort would affect the increase in net income as a result of having the private
label and this changes the threshold development costs. Within the interval
q < RPM < 1, the vertically integrated supply chain’s promotional strategy
can be characterized according to three sub-intervals. For RPM in the lower
sub-interval it promotes the national brand more than the private label (i.e.
product line extension); for RPM in the intermediate sub-interval, it promotes
both products equally; and for RPM in the upper sub-interval, it promotes
the private label more than the national brand. Because the analysis of this
vertically integrated solution does not yield much additional insight, we omit
the details. Similarly, the analysis of the sub-game in which the retailer does
not develop the private label (d = 0) is a relatively straight-forward extension
of the analysis in Section 3.3.1, and this too is omitted.
To demonstrate the interaction between the two strategic levers that
are available to the retailer, i.e. promotion and private label development, we
focus our attention on the sub-game (d = 1) in which the retailer develops
the private label. As a consequence of the fact that the retailer’s profit is
separable in pricing and promotion, the retailer’s optimal pricing response to







as defined in Lemma 3.3.2 and the regions RN , RB, and RP as defined in (2.6)
(RN = R2, RP = R1, and RB = R1,2). Thus, depending on the value of d, the
retailer’s profit π (d, w, pn, pp, x, y) can be written as:
π̄ (0) = π(w, pn, q)− C (x, 0)
π̄ (1) =
{
π(w, pn, pp) (1 + x) + π(w, 1, pp)(y − x) −C (x, y)− g if y ≥ x
π(w, pn, pp) (1 + y) + π(w, pn, q)(x− y)− C (x, y)− g if x ≥ y
where π̄ (0) = π̄ (0, w, pn, pp, x, y) and π̄ (1) = π̄ (1, w, pn, pp, x, y). Borrowing
and extending the notation from Section 3.3, let x0(w) and p0n(w) as the re-
tailer’s optimal promotional and pricing responses conditional upon d = 0. It











Similarly, let x1(w) , y1(w), p1n(w), and p
1
p(w) as the retailer’s optimal promo-
tional and pricing responses conditional upon d = 1.
Theorem 3.4.1. For the case when the retailer has private label capability,
d = 1, there exist four constants w1, w2, w3, and w4, such that the retailer’s
optimal pricing and promotional strategies can be characterized as follows,
where π (w, pn, pp) is defined in equation (3.2):
1. When 0 ≤ w ≤ w1, the retailer promotes and sells only the national
brand by setting p1n (w) =
1+Kw
1+K
and x1 (w) = 1
a
π (w, p1n, q). For the
private label, she sets y1 (w) = 0 and she is indifferent among all pp ≥ q.
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2. When w1 < w < w2, the retailer promotes and sells both products.
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3. When w2 ≤ w ≤ w3, the retailer promotes and sells both products. She
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4. When w3 < w < w4, the retailer promotes and sells both products.






, and she pro-





















5. When w4 ≤ w ≤ 1, the retailer promotes and sells only the private label
by setting p1p(w) =
q+Kc
1+K






. For the national
brand, she sets x1 (w) = 0 and she is indifferent among all pn ≥ 1.
As before, when the private label is not sold, it would not be sold for any
pp ≥ qp1n (w), so p1p = q is an optimal response. Similarly,when the national
brand is not sold, it would not be sold for any pn ≥ p1p(w) + 1 − q, so that
p1n = 1 is an optimal response.
The above result demonstrates how the retailer can use promotional
effort to either substitute for or to complement her private label capability.





since the maximum margin on the national brand is 1−w for the retailer. Thus,
as w increases, the relative efficiency of the private label increases in the eyes of
the retailer. From Theorem 3.4.1, we can see that as w increases enough that
the retailer begins selling the private label, she initially promotes it less than
the national brand. In this range, w < w2, the private label is less efficient
than the national brand, and its main role is to encourage the manufacturer to
lower his wholesale price. Since the retailer’s ability to promote the national
brand also encourages the manufacturer to offer a lower wholesale price, the
private label is a strategic substitute for promotion. As the wholesale price
increases further to w > w3, the retailer promotes the private label more than
the national brand, eventually promoting and selling only the private label
when w > w4. In this range, the private label becomes more efficient than the
national brand, and the retailer’s ability to promote it amplifies the increase in
her net income that she receives as a result of having private label capability.
Thus, promotion serves as a strategic complement to private label capability.
As we did in our original model, we can again express the manufac-
turer’s profit as a function of his wholesale price, w, taking into account the
retailer’s best pricing and promotional response. When d = 0, the manufac-
turer’s profit will be Π(w) = (1 + x0(w)) Π (w, p0n(w), q). When d = 1, the
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[1 + x1 (w)] Π (w, p1n (w) , q) , if 0 ≤ w ≤ w1;
[x1 (w) − y1 (w)] Π (w, p1n (w) , q)+
[1 + y1 (w)] Π
(




, if w1 ≤ w ≤ w2;
[1 + x1 (w)] Π
(




, if w2 ≤ w ≤ w3;
[1 + x1 (w)] Π
(




, if w3 ≤ w ≤ w4;
0, if w4 ≤ w ≤ 1.
(3.16)
Although we have not been able to obtain a closed form solution for the equi-
librium value of w for this sub-game, it can be found numerically. We can
then determine the threshold development costs just as we did for our original
model. Recall that ĝ and ḡ denote the threshold development costs below
which the private label would be developed by the vertically integrated supply
chain and by the decentralized supply chain respectively. Recall also, that
∆SC denotes the increase in the net income of the decentralized supply chain
that results from the retailer having private label capability.
To illustrate the strategic interaction between private label capability
and promotion, we replicated the numerical analysis from Figure 3.4, this time
including promotional effects, and the results are presented in Figure 3.5. As
before, in plots a-c, we take C = 0.5, and allow c to vary for K = 0.5, K = 1,
and K = 2. Similarly, in plots d-f, we take q = 0.6, c = 0.4 and allow C to
vary for K = 0.5, K = 1, and K = 2. We take the promotional parameters
to be a = r = 0.1 throughout. These parameter values imply that promotion
is relatively effective. For example, for the case in which q = 0.6, c = 0.4
, C = 0.5, and K = 1, the equilibrium effect of promotion was to increase
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consumer exposure to the products by about 50%. For smaller values of a,
promotional effects obvioulsy create a larger distortion of our original results,
while for larger values, the effects of promotion gradually disapear. On the
other hand, varying the value of the promotional synergy parameter, r, has
relatively little effect on the fundamental structure of the results shown in
Figure 3.5.
Let us now compare Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.4. First, we note that the
intercept of ĝ with the horizontal axis, which represents c or C , is not affected
by promotional effects. This is a reflection of the separability of pricing and
promotion so that promotion does not affect the minimum value of RPM for
which the vertically integrated supply chain would develop the product line ex-
tension even with zero development costs. To assess the strategic interactions
between private label capability and promotion, let us begin by comparing the
regions for which ḡ > 0 in Figures 3.5a - 3.5c to those in Figures 3.4a - 3.4c.
In all cases, when the retailer can promote, the range of c for which ḡ > 0
contracts. Specifically, private label capability stops increasing the retailer’s
net income at lower values of c when she can promote. This is most evident
when K = 0.5, where consumer valuations are concentrated at the high end,
but it occurs in all three cases. This implies that for the largest values of c
for which the private label would be developed, i.e. when RPM ∈ NPM ,
the ability to promote decreases the retailer’s proclivity to develop the private
label. For further evidence of this, we can compare the minimum values of C
for which ḡ > 0 in Figures 3.5d - 3.5f versus in Figures 3.4d - 3.4f. Again, the
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ability to promote causes the range of C for which ḡ > 0 to contract. At the
smallest values of C for which the private label would be developed, i.e. when
RPM ∈ NPM , the ability to promote decreases the retailer’s proclivity to
develop the private label. These comparisons suggest that for private labels
that are relatively inefficient as substitutes for the national brand, the ability
to develop a private label is a strategic substitute for the ability to influence
demand through promotion.
On the other hand, let us consider how the two strategic levers interact
when the private label is efficient, which is the case in the figures when either
C is large or c is small. Comparing the value of ḡ for the lowest values of
c in Figures 3.5a - 3.5c to those in Figures 3.4a - 3.4c, it is quite clear that,
for these cases of very efficient private labels, as measured by large RPM ,
promotional ability increases the retailer’s proclivity to introduce the private
label. Similarly, by comparing the value of ḡ for the largest values of C in
Figures 3.5d - 3.5f to those in Figures 3.4d - 3.4f, which are again indicative of
high RPM , promotional ability increases the retailer’s proclivity to introduce
the private label.
These comparisons indicate that the nature of the strategic interaction
between private label development and promotion depends upon the relative
efficiency of the private label. When RPM is small and the private label is rel-
atively inefficient, the two are strategic substitutes. On the other hand, when
RPM is high, and the private label is efficient, then the two are strategic com-
plements; the ability to promote only magnifies the benefits from developing
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the private label.
Finally, the discontinuities in both ḡ and ∆SC that appear in Figure 3.5
deserve some discussion These discontinuities are the consequence of how the
retailer allocates her promotional effort as w increases. Recall from Theorem
3.4.1 that as w increases, the retailer shifts from allocating more promotional
effort to the national brand to allocating more effort to the private label. The
discontinuities are the result of how the manufacturer anticipates this response
in equilibrium.
3.5 Conclusions
The main contribution of our work is to recognize the role that is played
by a retailer’s ability to develop and produce her own private label product
in coordinating a decentralized supply chain. In contrast to the existing lit-
erature, we explicitly consider the fact that development costs are often a
prerequisite for a retailer selling her own private label, and we also recog-
nize that a retailer’s marginal costs may differ from those of a national brand
manufacturer, both absolutely and relative to the qualities of their products.
By comparing a private label in a decentralized supply chain to a
product-line extension in a vertically integrated supply chain, we obtain a
working definition of a structurally efficient private label as one that would be
developed as a product line extension by a vertically integrated supply chain.
We then establish that, in a decentralized supply chain, the retailer will de-
velop structurally efficient private labels (if she has the opportunity to do so),
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but she will also develop some structurally inefficient private labels. While the
development of these structurally inefficient private labels always reduces the
profit of the national brand manufacturer, they may or may not lead to higher
overall supply chain profits. When development costs are low enough, the re-
tailer benefits more from developing the private label than the manufacturer
loses, so that their combined profits increase. Thus, even though the private
label would not have been developed by a vertically integrated supply chain as
a product line extension, it nevertheless is developed by a decentralized supply
chain and furthermore actually serves to increase the overall profit. For these
cases, the structural inefficiency of the private label is dominated by its miti-
gating effects upon double marginalization. However, at higher (but not too
high) development costs, the retailer develops structurally inefficient private
labels that benefit her less than they harm the manufacturer. In these cases,
the fixed cost and the adverse cannibalization effects of the private label more
than offset its mitigating effects upon double marginalization.
In an extension to our base model, we endow the retailer with the
additional strategic lever of being able to exert promotional effort to increase
the number of consumers who are exposed to the private label and/or the
national brand. This analysis yields the insight that the strategic interaction
between private label development and promotional effort depends upon the
relative efficiency of the private label. When the private label is efficient,
i.e. its cost to quality ratio is low, the ability to exert promotional effort
serves only to enhance its attractiveness. On the other hand, when the private
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label is less efficient, i.e. it has a higher cost to quality ratio, then private
label development and the promotional effort are strategic substitutes. For
these cases, the private label is developed primarily to create pressure on the
manufacturer to lower his wholesale price. But because the retailer’s ability to
exert promotional effort also puts downward pressure on the wholesale price,
promotional effort serves as a strategic substitute for private label development
in these cases.
Finally, we have obtained all of our results for a family of distributions
of consumer valuations that is more general than the uniform. While this is
itself a technical contribution, the main benefit is that it has allowed us to glean
some useful insights into how the distribution of consumer valuations affects
the role that is played by a private label. Somewhat contrary to intuition, the
role of the private label is most significant, in terms of its impact on both the
retail and supply chain profits, when consumer valuations are concentrated at
the high end of the spectrum.
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πB ΠB ΠBSC
RPM ∈ N 1
K
∆1 − g 1+KK2 ∆1 1+2KK2 ∆1 − g
RPM ∈ NPM 1
K
∆2 − g (1+K)(c−qC)K(q−c) ∆2
q(1−C)+K(c−qC)
K(q−c) ∆2 − g












RPM ∈ P q
K
∆2 − g 0 qK ∆2 − g
Table 3.1: The equilibrium profit of the retailer, the manufacturer, and
the supply chain when the retailer has developed the private label capa-

















Figure 3.1: Timing in the base model.
Figure 3.2: The structure of the Stackelberg game and the two sub-games
d = 0 and d = 1.
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Figure 3.3: The ranges of RPM values plotted against the quality level q of
the private label for each type of equilibrium.
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(a) K = 0.5 (b) K = 1 (c) K = 2
(d) K = 0.5 (e) K = 1 (f) K = 2
Figure 3.4: The retailer’s private label capability development decision plotted in (c, g) and (C, g) spaces
without promotional effects.
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(d) K = 0.5 (e) K = 1 (f) K = 2




Competition and Product Line Efficiency
4.1 Introduction
Since Apple Inc. introduced its first portable media player, iPod, in
October 2001, Apple has developed several generations, from the iPod Classic
version to the most recent iPod Shuffle. As of September 2008, more than 173
million iPods have been sold worldwide, making iPod the best-selling digital
audio player series in history. However, the high product margin has attracted
numerous competitors to this new market, among them the Walkman MS se-
ries which was first introduced by Sony Corporation at the end of 2003, and
the Microsoft Zune which appeared first in November 2006. Regarding manu-
facturing, numerous components such as CPUs, hard drives, batteries, etc. are
needed to make these portable media players. Among all those components,
some critical components are usually supplied by a small number of suppliers.
These components are normally made by suppliers such as Toshiba for hard
drives, Sony for batteries, and Freescale Semiconductor for chips, rather than
by the producers of the audio players. In PC industry, firms also share com-
mon critical components from the same supplier. For example, All windows
based PCs are using Microsoft Windows operating systems, whether they are
high end work station computers or low end personal computers.
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With an incumbent original equipment manufacturer (OEM) such as
Apple and a strategic supplier such as Toshiba or Freescale to supply different
components, it is interesting to see how the entry of a rival such as Microsoft
affects the performance of the incumbent, and whether the incumbent OEM’s
capacity investment has any impact on the interactions with the supplier and
the rival OEM. Without strategic suppliers, obviously the incumbent will suf-
fer as its demand is cannibalized by the rival OEM. However, the effect on
the incumbent OEM’s performance is not clear when a strategic supplier is
present, because with the strategic supplier who sells a critical component to
both the incumbent OEM and the rival OEM, the role of competition may
change. On one hand, the rival OEM’s product cannibalizes the demand of
the incumbent. On the other hand, in order to induce the rival OEM to en-
ter the market, the component supplier may have incentives to accept lower
margins, particularly if the rival either has higher production costs or lower
quality than the incumbent. In this sense, competition may actually enhance
a firm’s strategic positioning with respect to the supplier.
We also notice that firms intentionally create inefficiency in their prod-
uct line by limiting the availability of their higher margin, popular products.
For example, many brands today introducing limited edition products as part
of their product line. Limited edition products have been used in a lot of
industries such as instruments (e.g., Steinway pianos), automobiles and in
fashion goods. A motivation for bringing inefficiency to product line that is
often discussed in literature are to create scarcity by limiting the quantity of a
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product. For the competitive implications, Balachander and Stock (2009, [4])
study the question of when and when not to offer the limited edition products.
However, there has been little discussion of the strategic interaction between
competition and product line inefficiency when competing firms facing a com-
mon supplier. In this paper, we investigate the strategic effect of competition
and product line inefficiency in a supply chain setting where the competing
firms facing a supplier of common components. Especially, we answer the fol-
lowing research questions: If an OEM faces potential entry of a rival, how will
this affect its profit? How does the OEM’s capacity commitment affect the
wholesale price offer by the supplier? How does the OEM balance the strate-
gic effects of competition and capacity commitment when facing a common
supplier?
Motivated by the above interaction between the strategic supplier and a
potential rival OEM, even in the absence of competition, the incumbent OEM
may be able to improve her strategic positioning with respect to the supplier by
vertically differentiating her product line and limiting the amount of capacity
that can be used to produce the high-end product. More specifically, when
the quality of the low-end product is not too low and the incumbent can
credibly signal the supplier that she will only produce a limited number of
high-end products, the strategic supplier can either charge a high wholesale
price to the incumbent–in which case the incumbent buys a limited quantity
to only produce the high-end product, or charge a low wholesale price to
induce the incumbent to buy a larger quantity for production of both the
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high- and low-end products. In reality, the incumbent OEM can make the
signal credible by ways such as outsourcing the production of low-end versions
that do not include proprietary technology, or showing the supplier that the
high-end version requires some special components that are not needed for
the low-end and thus the produced quantity of high-end products is limited
by these special components. The incumbent OM may gain leverage with
the supplier for a lower wholesale price by mimicking the effect of low-end
competition from a rival OEM.
On the other hand, a commitment to a limited capacity may in itself
invite the entry of a rival OEM because the rival now faces a lower wholesale
price as well. Thus, the incumbent’s capacity pre-commitment has strate-
gic effects on both the supplier who decides whether or not to offer a lower
wholesale price, and the rival OEM who determines whether or not to produce
low-end products and enter the market to take advantage of a possible lower
wholesale price.
To study those questions, we use a quantity competition model to
present the strategic issues involved among an incumbent original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) and a potential entrant producing a low end version of
the product facing a common supplier. To illustrate the results, we consider
a simple supply chain consisting of a component supplier (S), an incumbent
OEM (I), and a potential entrant (E). The product under consideration has
two versions: the high end version and the low end version. For simplicity,
we refer to the two products as product H and product L, respectively. We
67
assume that the perceived quality level of the low end version product L is
lower than product H. To produce both products H and L, firm I and firm E
need to procure certain components from the common supplier S. We assume
the supplier incurs a unit production cost for the component. To produce the
high end product H, a unit premium is incurred. We assume the production
cost for product L is zero. This assumption is not a requirement in our model.
It is made for the simplicity of notation and model analysis. Furthermore,
we assume that the incumbent can produce both product H and L. But the
entrant can only produce product L. The inefficiency of the product line is
operationalized by assuming that the incumbent OEM can credibly commit
to a production capacity (or quantity) for the high end product H.
This work is closely related to three streams of research: market seg-
mentation and product line decisions, distribution channel structure, and ca-
pacity decisions. Our model borrows extensively from the market segmentation
literature. In their seminal work, Mussa and Rosen (1978, [34]) explore optimal
prices and qualities for a product line that is sold to heterogeneous consumers
with continuous preferences. Following that, Moorthy (1984, [31]) considers
how to determine product prices for a product line with a finite number of
consumer classes. Moorthy and Png (1992, [32]) study a two-period model
with two different quality products and explore whether or not to introduce
both quality products at the first period or only the higher in the first pe-
riod. Desai (2001, [16]) compares a firm’s pricing and quality decisions in a
monopoly setting and a duopoly situation and finds that competition can af-
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fect a firm’s optimal decisions. More recently, Lacourbe et al. (2009, [37])
consider product line decisions with two dimensions of consumer preferences:
vertical differentiation for product performance and horizontal differentiation
for product feature.
The literature of distribution channel structure is extensive and various
issues have been considered (e.g., contract types that can coordinate vertical
members in a channel (Jeuland and Shugan 1983, [23]), equilibrium chan-
nel structures when there are horizontal competitions (McGuire and Staelin
1983, [28]), the influence of channel power on firms’ decisions (Choi 1991, [10],
and Lee and Staelin 1997, [26], etc.). Our paper is more related to how the
interactions among different firms in a channel affect individual firm’s perfor-
mance. Along this line, Arya et al. (2007, [3]) show that a supplier’s encroach-
ment can benefit the retailer as the supplier will lower its wholesale price to
support its retailer’s demand. When network effects exist, Conner (1995, [12])
demonstrates that an innovator can earn higher profit by encouraging clones
from competitors. Sun et al. (2004, [45]) consider an innovator’s four strate-
gies: 1) a single-product-monopoly strategy, 2) a technology-licensing strategy,
3) a product-line-extension strategy and 4) a combination strategy of both
product line extension and technology licensing. They show that product line
extension is superior to licensing when the network effect is weak. Similar to
the study of Arya et al. (2007, [3]), we don’t consider network externality
effects. Though wholesale price is the main driver of firm performance as a
result of supplier-manufacturer interactions, this paper considers a different
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setting and different research questions from Arya et al. (2007, [3]). Planning
for capacity is critical for firms as normally a large amount of capital needs to
be committed. The study of capacity related issues has been various. Among
these include capacity expansion by determining the capacity size, time, lo-
cation, etc. so as to meet increasing demand over time (Luss 1982, [27]);
capacity (equipment) replacement by taking into account future changes in
capacity requirement (Rajagopalan et al. 1998, [39]); flexible capacity amount
to meet uncertain demand for multiple products (van Mieghem 1998, [49]);
simultaneous capacity and production planning to maximize profits over mul-
tiple periods (Angelus and Porteus 2002, [2]), etc. Readers interested more in
this area please refer to the comprehensive review presented by van Mieghem
(2003, [50]). Differing from the above papers, we consider a manufacturer’s
capacity commitment on its high end product and the impact of this commit-
ment on production decisions of its competitor.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we
describe the key elements of our models. The key results of the models are
presented in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. In Section 4.3, we present the results for the
cases without strategic suppliers (those models whose names begin with “N”).
In Section 4.4, we analyze the models with strategic suppliers and compare
them to those without strategic suppliers. Finally, we conclude this chapter
by summarizing the key findings and point to some future research directions.
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4.2 The Basic Model
Consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier (S), an incumbent
OEM (I), and a potential entrant OEM (E). We adopt the convention of using
feminine pronouns for the OEMs and masculine pronouns for the supplier. In
addition, we will henceforth refer to the supplier of the critical component as
the supplier, the incumbent OEM as the incumbent, and the potential entrant
OEM as the entrant.
The supplier produces a critical component at marginal cost c per unit.
The incumbent produces a high-quality product (H) using the component at a
cost premium cH . She possibly also produces a low-end version of the product
(L). If the entrant enters the market, she produces the low-end version of
the product. Without loss of generality, we normalize the marginal cost of
producing product L to be zero. Our structural results do not depend on this
assumption.
On the demand side, we assume there is a continuum of potential con-
sumers with a total mass of one, each of them buys at most one unit of either
product H or product L. Each consumer has a valuation θ for product qual-
ity, which is assumed uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Similarly to Chen et al.
(2009, [9]), for any given prices pH and pL for product H and L, respectively,







θ − pH , if buying product H;
γ θ − pL, if buying product L;
0, if not buying at all.
(4.1)
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where, γ (0 < γ < 1) can be interpreted as the relative perceived quality
level of product L compared to product H (we normalize the perceived quality
level of product H to be one), or the net substitution effect between the two
products. We assume that 1 − cH − c > γ−cγ > 0, that is, product H has a
higher potential margin per unit of quality than product L. This assumption
implies that 1 − cH − c > γ − c > 0, which implies that if priced at marginal
costs, at least the consumer with highest valuation for quality (θ = 1) is
willing to buy both products, although product H is preferred to product
L. This assumption rules out the uninteresting case in which product H is
never offered by the incumbent, which is derived in Chen et al. (2009, [9]).
Notice that this assumption is not as restrictive as it looks like. For example,
when γ = 0.8 (product H and L have comparable perceived quality level), the
assumption requires cH < 0.25c. Given the assembly cost for product L is 0,
this is at all not an unreasonable assumption.
As is derived in Chen et al. (2009, [9]), when the price for product L
is low enough compared to the price for product H, that is, γpH > pL, both
products have positive demand. Consumers with θ ∈ [(pH − pL) / (1 − γ) , 1]
buy H, consumers with θ ∈ [pL/γ, (pH − pL) / (1 − γ)] buy L, while consumers
with θ ∈ [0, pL/γ] buy nothing. Thus, the inverse demand functions for H and
L can be derived as follows:
pH (qH, qL) = 1 − qH − γ qL; pL (qH , qL) = γ (1 − qH − qL) . (4.2)
where, pH and pL are the market clearing prices when the quantities are qH
and qL for product H and product L, respectively.
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If only product H is offered, or both products are offered but γ pH <
pL (under these prices, any consumers who buy prefer H to L), consumers
with θ ∈ [pH , 1] buy product H and the inverse demand function for H is
pH (qH, 0) = 1 − qH. Similarly, when only product L is offered with price pL,
consumers with θ ∈ [pL/γ, 1] buy product L and the inverse demand for L is
pL (0, qL) = γ (1 − qL). Note that as the quality (or substitution) parameter
γ increases, the inverse demand for L increases at the expense of demand for
H. This particular demand model is commonly used in economics literature,
among them, Mussa and Rosen (1978, [34]) and Yehezkel (2008, [53]).
As a concluding remark, we solve the case of a vertically integrated
channel (a single firm produces and sells both products). In this case, the
quantities qH and qL are choosen to maximize the channel profit:
πV I (qH, qL) =
{
[pH (qH, qL) − cH − c] qH + [pL (qH, qL) − c] qL, if qL > 0;
[pH (qH, 0) − cH − c] qH, otherwise.
(4.3)




(1 − cH − c) , qV IL = 0. (4.4)
Note that qV IH > 0 from the assumption that 1−cH −c > 0. Intuitively,
when the cost-to-quality ratio, c/γ of product L is smaller than that of product
H (cH + c, recall that the quality level of H is normalized to be one), L is
nonetheless efficient. Otherwise, L is inefficient and the vertically integrated
channel will not offer it. We use the same concept of relative efficiency of L
compared to H as in Chen et al. (2009, [9]). The difference (1 − γ) c/γ − cH
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thus can be interpreted as a measure of the relative efficiency of L to H. Under
our assumption, L is inefficient and is not offered by the vertically integated
channel, and when −cH + (1 − γ) c/γ increases, L becomes more efficient, as
is pointed out in Yehezkel (2008, [53]). In this paper, we focus on the case
in which product L is inefficient. We will show that even though product L
is inefficient, the entry of an entrant producing product L may nonetheless
benefit the incumbent OEM under certain situations.
We use a game theoretical framework to study the interactions among
the supplier, the incumbent , and the entrant. We model the problem as a
three-stage game. In stage one, the incumbent set a capacity K for product
H and incurs a sunk cost cH per unit capacity installed if she pre-commits
on the capacity level. Otherwise, do nothing in this stage. In stage two,
the supplier sets a wholesale price w on the components after observing the
incumbent’s capacity level K for product H if the incumbent pre-commits to it
at stage one. In the final stage, the incumbent determines the sales quantities
of product H and L. The entrant determines whether to enter the market or
not. If she enters, she determines the sales quantity for product L. We use
a linear wholesale price contract for the supplier to sell the components to
the incumbent and entrant. As pointed out in Arya et al. (2007, [3]), linear
wholesale price contracts are commonly adopted in models of channel conflict
and also are prevalent in practice. The timeline is depicted in Figure 4.1.
In order to study the effects of product line inefficiency and compe-
tition, we compare the cases with and without competition, the cases with
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and without capacity pre-commitment. For notational simplicity, we use the
naming convention “ABC” to name each model we consider in this article,
where “A” stands for the situation whether there are strategic suppliers (“S”)
or not (“N”), “B” stands for whether the incumbent pre-commits on capacity
for product H (“C”) or not (“N”), and “C” stands for whether the entrant
enters the market (“R”) or not (“N”). For example, model “NNN” stands for
the case in which there is no strategic suppliers, no capacity pre-commitment,
and no competition1. The features of each of the seven different models con-
sidered in this work are summarized in Table 4.1 and the relationship among
the seven possible combinations are provided in Figure ??2.
4.3 The Benchmark: Without Strategic Suppliers
As a benchmark, we first study the models without strategic suppliers.
Three models are considered in this section: a) Model NNN: in this setting,
there is no strategic supplier, no capacity commitment, and no competition;
b) Model NNR: this is the model with competition; and c) Model NCR: the
model with capacity commitment and competition. Note that model NNN
is the same as the vertically integrated case and model NCN is equivalent to
model NNN.
In model NNR, the incumbent and the rival compete in the same mar-
1This is the case of a monopolist producing the products with unlimited capacity, or
equivalently, the vertically integrated case.
2The combination “NCN” is the same as “NNN” under our setting.
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ket: the incumbent sets output quantities for both products, while the rival
decides whether to enter the market and how much product L to produce if
she enters. The results are presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.1. (Equilibrium of Model NNR) In the presence of competi-
tion from the entrant, when there is no strategic supplier, the equilibrium can
be characterized as follows:







, the incumbent sets qNNRH =
1−c−cH
2
and qNNRIL = 0, and the entrant does not enter.



















All proofs in the paper are provided in appendix. The regions are shown
in Figure 4.3b. It is well-known that competition hurts the monopolist with
non-strategic supplier. The following result shows that the result is true even if
the competition is resulted from an entrant producing a low end version of the
product. In this case, demand cannibalization is the only effect of competition,
which lowers the incumbent’s profit.
Proposition 4.3.2. (Effect of Competition without Strategic Sup-
plier) Without strategic supplier, the presence of low end competition hurts
the incumbent: the incumbent’s sales quantities for both products and profit
are all lower than when there is no competition.
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The results are presented in Figure 4.4. In Figure 4.4a, we plot the
sales quantities for both products in model NNN and NNR. The solid line
indicates the incumbent’s sales quantities for product H in both models. The
top line is the sales quantity in model NNN, the bottom line is in model NNR.
Similarly, the dashed lines are for sales quantities for product L and the top
line is in model NNN and the bottom one is in model NNR. The dotted line is
for the rival’s sales quantitiy for product L in model NNR. With the presence
of a potential entrant in the market, the incumbent’s sales quantities for both
products decrease: there is demand cannibalization from the entry of the rival.
Figure 4.4b shows that the incumbent’s profit is lower with an entrant than
without.
Now consider the case in which the incumbent pre-commits to a capac-
ity level K for the high end product at a unit capacity cost cH . That is, the
incumbent can only produce the low end products (or produce nothing) if there
are more than K units of critical components available. In this setting, the
incumbent first pre-commits to the capacity level K for the high end product.
Then the incumbent determines the sales quantities qH and qIL for the high
end and low end products, respectively; simultaneously, the rival determines
the sales quantity qEL for the low end product.
Given the capacity level K for product H and the rival’s sales quan-
tity qEL, the incumbent’s decisions are the sales quantities qH and qIL which
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satisfies 0 ≤ qH ≤ K and 0 ≤ qIL. The incumbent’s problem is given by:
max
0≤qH≤K,qIL≥0
[pH (qH, qIL + qEL) − c] qH + [pL (qH , qIL + qEL) − c] qIL − cH · K.
(4.5)
Similarly, the rival sets her sales quantity qEL for product L to maximize her
profit as long as the profit is nonnegative:
max
qEL≥0
[pL (qH , qIL + qEL) − c] qEL. (4.6)
The equilibrium, including the optimal capacity level K for product H, the
incumbent’s sales quantities qH and qIL, and the entrant’s sales quantity qEL
(qEL = 0 stands for the case in which the entrant does not enter the market)
are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.3. (Equilibrium of Model NCR) Without strategic supplier,
if the supplier pre-commits on capacity for product H, then there exist four
mutually exclusive regions RiNCR for the values of (c, cH), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, such
that the equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
1. When (c, cH) ∈ R1NCR, the incumbent sets KNCR = 2−γ−c4−γ , qNCRH = K,





2. When (c, cH) ∈ R2NCR, the incumbent sets KNCR = 2−γ−c−2cH4−2γ , qNCRH =












3. When (c, cH) ∈ R3NCR, the incumbent sets KNCR = 1−c−cH2 , qNCRH = K,
and qNCRIL = 0, and the entrant does not enter the market.
4. When (c, cH) ∈ R4NCR, the incumbent sets KNCR = γ−cγ , qNCRH = K,
and qNCRIL = 0, and the entrant does not enter the market.
The definition of the four regions are provided in the appendix.
Without strategic supplier, competition plays a sole strategic role in
the interaction between the incumbent and the rival: demand cannibalization.
Thus, if the incumbent is endowed with the capability of pre-committing on
a capacity level for the high end product, he will pre-commit to a higher
capacity level than what he would produce without capacity pre-commitment
in order to deter potential entry. In this case, by sunking the premium to
produce the high end product, the incumbent can credibly signal to the rival
a lower cost-to-quality ratio (since the incumbent and the rival will have the
same production cost c to produce the high end product and low end product,
respectively). This credible signal can help the incumbent to deter entry from
the rival and thus achieve higher profit. The above analysis is formalized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.4. (Effect of Capacity Commitment without Strate-
gic Supplier) Without strategic supplier, if there is potential low end com-
petition from the entrant, the incumbent always pre-commit on a higher ca-
pacity level for product H than what he would produce without capacity pre-
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commitment and does not produce product L. In both cases (with or without
capacity pre-commitment), the incumbent is worse off under competition.
Proposition 4.3.4 tells us that competition always hurts the incumbent
without strategic supplier, even when the incumbent is endowed with the ca-
pability of pre-committing on a capacity level for the high end product to help
to deter potential entry from the rival. In the later sections, we will compare
the results to those with strategic suppliers to see how the presence of strate-
gic supplier changes the strategic effects of both capacity commitment and
competition.
4.4 Analysis and Findings with Strategic Suppliers
In this section, we consider how the presence of a strategic supplier
changes the effects of competition and capacity pre-commitment. More specif-
ically, we study how the presence of a strategic supplier changes the role of
competition by comparing the models without (model SNN) and with com-
petition (model SNR). Next, we study the possibility of a monopoly OEM
mimicing the strategic effect of low end competition by limiting her capacity
for product H without demand cannibalization in Section 4.4.2. We compare
the model with capacity precommitment (SCN) to model SNN. Finally, in
Section 4.4.3, we consider the case in which the incumbent faces low end com-
petition and she can pre-commit on a capacity for product H at the same time
(model SCR, which will be compared to model SCN). We focus our atten-
tion on how should the incumbent balance the strategic issues related to the
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supplier and the competitor.
4.4.1 Effect of Competition with Strategic Supplier
In this section, we study the effect of competition with strategic supplier
when the incumbent is not endowed with the capability of pre-committing on
capacity level for the high end product (model SNN vs. model SNR). We show
that, contrast to the case of non-strategic supplier, low end competition may
benefit the incumbent. The reasoning is as follows. In order to induce the
rival to produce the inefficient low end version product, the strategic supplier
has to lower his wholesale price. Under certain conditions, the benefit from
the lower wholesale price can offerset the demand cannibalization from the low
end competition for the incumbent. Thus the incumbent may benefit from the
low end competition.
In model SNN, the supplier sets the wholesale price w first. After
observing the wholesale price, the incumbent determines the sales quantities
qH and qIL for the high end and low end products, respectively. For any given
wholesale price w, the incumbent produces only the high end product since




[pH (qH , 0) − cH − w] qH
and the incumbent produces qH (w) = (1 − cH − w) /2 as long as w ≤ 1 − cH ;
otherwise, the incumbent produces qH (w) = 0. Thus, the supplier’s problem
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is to find a wholesale price w to solve the following problem:
max
0≤w≤1−cH
(w − c) (1 − cH − w) /2.
The optimal wholesale price is given by wSNN = (1 + c − cH) /2. In equi-
librium, the supplier’s profit is πSNNS = (1 − c − cH)2 /8. The incumbent’s
sales quantities are qSNNH = (1 − c − cH) /4 and qSNNIL = 0, and his profit is
πSNNI = (1 − c − cH)2 /16.
In model SNR, after observing the wholesale price w from the supplier,
the incumbent and the rival simultaneously determine their sales quantities
qH , qIL, and qEL (rival’s sales quantity of the low end product). Given the
wholesale price w and rival’s sales quantity qEL, the incumbent’s problem is:
max
qH≥0,qIL≥0
[pH (qH, qIL + qEL) − cH −w] qH + [pL (qH, qIL + qEL) − w] qIL.
The solution for qH is given by




, if qEL + 2qIL ≤ 1−cH−wγ ;
0, if qEL + 2qIL ≥ 1−cH−wγ .
and the solution for qIL is given by





1 − qEL − 2qH − wγ
)
, if qEL + 2qH ≤ γ−wγ ;
0, if qEL + 2qH ≥ γ−wγ .
Similarly, the entrant solves her problem by finding the optimal value of qEL
given qH and qIL:
max
qEL≥0
[pL (qH, qIL + qEL) − w] qEL.
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The solution is given by




, if qH + qIL ≤ γ−wγ ;
0, if qH + qIL ≥ γ−wγ .
Combining the solutions for the incumbent and the entrant, we have the quan-
tity decisions for both the incumbent and the entrant as shown in Table 4.2.
The supplier determines the wholesale price w to maximize his profit




(w − c) [qH (w) + qIL (w) + qEL (w)] , (4.7)
where, qH (w), qIL (w), and qEL (w) are as given in Table 4.2. The equilibrium
is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.1. (Equilibrium of Model SNR) In model SNR, there exist
two mutually exclusive regions R1SNR and R
2
SNR for the values of (γ, c, cH),
such that the equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
1. When (γ, c, cH) ∈ R1SNR, the supplier sets the wholesale price w =
γ(3−γ−cH )+2c
4
, the incumbent orders qH =
8−2c−(8−γ)cH−γ(7−γ)
γ(4−γ) , qIL = 0,
and the rival orders qRL =
γ((5−γ)γ+(6−γ)cH−2)−2c(2−γ)
4γ(4−γ) ;
2. When (γ, c, cH) ∈ R2SNR, the supplier sets the wholesale price w =
1+c−cH
2
, the incumbent orders qH =
1−c−cH
4
, qIL = 0, and the rival orders
qRL = 0.
The two regions are defined in the appendix. An interesting question
is that if the incumbent is always not better off when the rival orders positive
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quantity from the supplier. That is, does low end competition always hurt the
incumbent? The answer is no.
Proposition 4.4.2. (Effect of Low End Competition with Strategic
Suppliers) In the presence of a strategic supplier, there exists a region RSNR
for the values of (γ, c, cH), such that the incumbent may benefit from low end
competition from the entrant if and only if (γ, c, cH) ∈ RSNR. Furthermore,
the supplier charges a lower wholesale price when there is low end competition
than when there is no competition.
The underlying reason of the benefit for the incumbent from the low
end competition is as follows. The incumbent would not produce the inefficient
low end version product. The rival OEM produces and sells the inefficient low
end version product. In order to bring the rival to the market, the only way
for the supplier is to lower his wholesale price so that the rival can also enjoy
a nonnegative profit. At certain range, the benefit for the incumbent from
the lower wholesale price offsets the demand cannibalization from the low end
competitor.
4.4.2 Incumbent’s Capacity Pre-Commitment for High End Prod-
ucts
With the presence of strategic supplier, we have shown in the above sec-
tion that the incumbent can benefit from the low end competition introduced
by a rival OEM as long as the component cost is not too high and the pre-
mium for the high end product is not too high. In this section, we will answer
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the question that if the incumbent can obtain similar strategic effect without
demand cannibalization. In this paper, we allow the incumbent to pre-commit
on the capacity for the high end version product before he observes the whole-
sale price set by the supplier. We will show that the incumbent will obtain
similar strategic effect as low end competition but without cannibalization.
We also show that the incumbent will always pre-commit to a lower capacity
level for the high end product that what he would produce without capacity
pre-commitment.
The sequence of the decisions is specified as follows: First, the incum-
bent decides on the capacity level K for the high end product; Second, the
supplier observes the capacity level K and sets his wholesale price w. Finally,
the incumbent sets his order quantities qH and qIL for the high end and low
end products, respectively. As usual, we use backward induction to solve this
problem. Notice that this is model SCN.
At the third stage, the incumbent’s problem is:
max
0≤qH≤K,qIL≥0
[pH (qH, qIL) − w] qH + [pL (qH , qIL) − w] qIL − cHK.
Using Lagrangian method, we can find the incumbent’s optimal decisions qH




qH = K, qIL =
γ−w
2γ
−K, if 0 ≤ w ≤ γ (1 − 2K) ;




, qIL = 0, if w ≥ 1 − 2K.
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(w − c) (γ − w) , if 0 ≤ w ≤ γ (1 − 2K) ;
K (w − c) , if γ (1 − 2K) ≤ w ≤ 1 − 2K;
1
2
(w − c) (1 − w) , if w ≥ 1 − 2K.
(4.8)
Given the capacity level K for product H, the supplier’s optimal choice of
wholesale price w is characterized in the following result.
Lemma 4.4.3. (Supplier’s Optimal Wholesale Price in Model SCN)
Given the capacity level K for product H, the supplier’s optimal wholesale price
w is given as follows:







, the supplier sets w = c+γ
2
; the in-









≤ K ≤ 1−c
4
, the supplier sets w = 1 − 2K;
the incumbent produces product H up to capacity K and does not produce
any product L;
3. When K ≥ 1−c
4
, the supplier sets w = 1+c
2
; the incumbent produces
product H up to 1−c
4
and does not produce product L.
For small values of capacity level K, since the total units of product
H and L are constant when K increases, the supplier is not willing to change
the wholesale price. However, when capacity level K takes intermediate val-
ues, when the incumbent increases K, the supplier can sell more units of the
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component. Thus, the supplier is willing to lower the wholesale price. Finally,
when K is large enough, increasing K has no effect on incumbent’s ordering
quantity for the component. The supplier keeps the wholesale price a constant.
Based on the supplier’s optimal response for any given value of the capacity
level K for product H, we can identify the incumbent’s optimal choice of the
capacity level K. We summarize the result in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.4. (Equilibrium of Model SCN) When the incumbent pre-
commit to a capacity level K for product H, there exists a threshold value
cSCNH such that 0 ≤ cSCNH < c−cγγ and the equilibrium of the 3-stage game can
be characterized as follows:
1. When 0 ≤ cH ≤ cSCNH , the incumbent sets a capacity level K = 1−c4 ;
the supplier charges a wholesale price w = 1+c
2
; the incumbent produces
product H up to capacity K and does not produce product L.








; the supplier charges a wholesale price w = γ+c
2
; the
incumbent produces product H up to capacity K and does not produce
product L.
Recall that when there is no strategic supplier, the incumbent always
pre-commit to a higher capacity for product H. This result tells us that when
the incumbent has to pre-commit to a capacity level for product H before
observing the wholesale price for the component, the incumbent intents to
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commit to a lower capacity level, which induces the supplier to charge a lower
wholesale price. However, the pre-commitment on capacity level for product H
may or may not benefit the incumbent. The effect of capacity pre-commitment
is two-folded: on one hand, pre-committing to a lower capacity for product
H helps to induce a lower wholesale price; on the other hand, pre-committing
to a lower capacity for product H limits the sales quantity of product H. The
following results formalize the above statement.
Proposition 4.4.5. (Effect of Capacity Pre-Commitment with Strate-
gic Suppliers) In model SCN, there exists a threshold value cSCNH,1 such that
cSCNH ≤ cSCNH,1 ≤ c−cγγ and the incumbent is worse off by pre-commiting on a
capacity for product H when 0 ≤ cH ≤ cSCNH,1 . However, the incumbent obtains




When the production premium for product H is relatively large, al-
though the reduction on wholesale price is small, the reduced sales quantity
by limiting the capacity for product H is also small. However, the rate of
reduction on wholesale price is higher (two times) than that on sales quan-
tity. Thus, when the production premium is large enough, the former effect
dominates and the incumbent benefits from this limited capacity on product
H.
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4.4.3 Strategic Issues Related to Supplier and Competitor
Now we investigate how should the incumbent balance the two strate-
gic issues related to supplier and competitor: in the presence of a strategic
supplier, the incumbent intends to pre-commit to a lower capacity for prod-
uct H to induce lower wholesale price and to pre-commit to a higher capacity
level to help to deter entry when there is no strategic suppliers. This case is
denoted by model SCR. The sequence of events in this three stage game is as
follows: In stage one, the incumbent sets a capacity K for product H at a unit
capacity cost cH ; in stage two, the supplier sets a wholesale price w for the
component after observing the capacity K for product H; in stage three, the
incumbent and the entrant determine their sales quantities for both products
(the entrant only determines the sales quantity for product L if she enters the
market) simultaneously.
4.5 Conclusion
In many industries, OEMs must obtain critical components from a few
powerful suppliers. For example, OEMs that produce information technology
hardware typically interact with highly concentrated supply industries that
are dominated by a few key participants, e.g. Microsoft, Intel, etc. To the
extent that the OEMs are also concentrated, e.g. Dell, Hewlett-Packard, etc.,
the interactions between the suppliers of critical components and the OEMs
are strategic. In order to better understand how an OEM should interact with
a strategic supplier, we consider how these interactions are influenced by the
89
structure of the market that is served by the OEM. We first demonstrate that
the presence of a rival who produces a low-end substitute for the OEM’s prod-
uct provides an incentive for the supplier to offer lower wholesale prices. So
long as the rival’s product is not too close a substitute for that of the OEM, she
benefits more from the lower wholesale prices offered by the supplier than she
is harmed by the cannibalization of her end demand. We then turn our atten-
tion to the question of how the interactions with a strategic supplier influence
the OEM’s decision on whether to extend her product line by introducing her
own low-end substitute. We find that, if she can credibly commit to limiting
the amount of capacity that will be available to produce the original version
of her product, then interactions with a strategic supplier will tend to cause
her to offer a broader product line. This result highlights an important trade-
off that is faced an OEM who interacts with strategic suppliers and faces the
threat of entry from rivals: By restricting her capacity to produce the original
version of her product, the OEM can improve her strategic positioning vis-a-
vis the supplier, but such a restriction of capacity will also invite the entry of
rivals. The final portion of our work investigates how such an OEM can invest
in capacity to balance this trade-off among strategic priorities.
We believe this research makes a valuable contribution to the OM liter-
ature. This research is closely related to the literature of capacity commitment
and product line design with or without competition. The operations man-
agement literature on capacity issues typically looks at capacity investment
when there are uncertainties such as demand or supply risks. Meanwhile, the
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marketing literature on product line design has continually put more empha-
sis on issues of how many different quality products to offer and how to deter
entrance of competition. This rese(Note: Liwen, this paper discuss the ra-
tionale of using linear prices and cites many papers that consider only linear
prices. We should cite these papers too.)arch bridges capacity investment in
OM literature with product line design in the marketing literature, and pro-
vides managerial insights into the strategic interactions between an incumbent
OEM and her supplier as well as a rival OEM.
91
Model Strategic Supplier Capacity Commitment Competition
NNN N N N
NNR N N Y
SNN Y N N
SNR Y N Y
SCN Y Y N
SCR Y Y Y
Table 4.1: The features of models considered in the paper.
Figure 4.1: Timing of events in base model.
Figure 4.2: The structure of the analysis of the six models in the paper.
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(a) Model NNN (b) Model NNR
(c) Model SNN (d) Model SNR
Figure 4.3: The equilibrium market structure for model NNN, NNR, SNN,
and SNR.
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(a) Sales quantities (b) Incumbent’s profits
Figure 4.4: The sales quantities for product H and L and the incumbent’s
























Table 4.2: Optimal production quantities of both products for any given value
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Private label (also called store brand) products are widely seen in re-
tailscape during the last decades. The world is changing from dominated
by manufacturer brands to a mix of manufacturer brands and retailer owned
brands. The name “private labels” comes from the fact that most of the re-
tailer brands, if not all, were carried exclusively by the owners of those brands.
For example, major U.S. retail chains such as WalMart, Target, JCPenny,
and big boxes such as Costco and Sam’s Club, have aggressively entered the
private label markets during the last decades. Costco’s Kirkland Signature,
JCPenny’s Arizona, and other retailer owned brands become more and more
popular among consumers now.
However, over time, we started to notice a change in the retail indus-
try. A few retailers began to distribute their so-called private labels through
their competing retailers. For example, starting on the fall of 2008, Safeway
began to roll out its popular O’ Organics organic foods and Eating Right
healthy foods store brands to a wider audience – competing food retailers in
the U.S. – along with to grocers globally. At the end of year 2008, as one of
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the largest office supply providers in U.S, OfficeMax partnered with Safeway
to provide office products and school supplies to grocery stores. ...Product se-
lections will include OfficeMax private label products such as award-winning
TUL writing instruments and various grades of OfficeMax-brand papers. More
recently, Sears Holdings Corp. has agreed to sell its popular Craftsman tool
brand through Ace Hardware stores, as the company turns again to outsiders
to help grow its sales. Sears roughly 900 department stores will remain the
headquarters for sales of Craftsman. In this sense, it is more appropriate to
call those private label products retailer brand products. We will adopt this
term throughout this paper.
The existing literature on private label vs. national brand has focused
mainly on the role of retailer brands as a means of obtaining competitive
advantages while dealing with national brand manufacturers. They all assume
that retailers who own the retailer brand only sell them in their own stores.
However, there is no work in the literature which studies the strategic effect
of selling retailer brands through competitors to establish strategic position
against the national brand manufacturers. To our best knowledge, our research
is the first work in the literature to do so.
Particularly, we are interested in the following research questions. First,
if you are a marketing manager of Safeway or OfficeMax, when should you
keep your retailer brands private? and when should you share your retailer
brands with your competing retailers? If you are the marketing manager of
the national brand manufacturer, what’s the implication for you when your
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retailer keeps its retailer brand private or shares it with other retailers of
yours? Finally, is it to the channel’s best interest when a retailer shares its
retailer brand with its competitors? We answer these questions in the rest of
this chapter.
5.2 Model Setup
Consider an upstream manufacturer (M) that produces a high-quality
national brand product (N). M sells the product N through two downstream
retailers A and B who distribute product N at zero retail costs. In addition
to selling product N, retailer A can also sell a lower-quality retailer brand
product (P). We normalize the marginal production cost of both products to
be zero for the tractability of the model. However, our qualitative results
do not change with positive marginal production costs. Retailer A may sell
product P through retailer B by incuring a fixed cost f > 0. This cost can
be the cost of recruiting dedicated sales force, or the cost of establishing and
maintaining the relationship with retailer B, or the cost of acquiring extra
production capacity for the extra sales through retailer B.
To investigate retailer A’s strategic decision of whether selling the re-
tailer brand product P through retailer B, we consider a base model in which
retailer A and retailer B operate in their respective exclusive markets (mar-
ket A and market B, respectively). Each market is consisting of a continuum
of potential consumers, each of whom buys at most one unit of the product.
The total mass of consumers for market A is a ≥ 0, while the total mass of
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consumers for market B is assumed to be of b ≥ 0. We study the effect of
competition in Section 5.4.
Products and consumers are modeled as specified in Chapter 2.
In general, we use superscript to denote the quantities in different mar-
kets, while subscript to denote different channel members and different prod-
ucts. For example, we use qAn,A to denote retailer A’s sales quantity for national
brand in market A, while qBp,B to denote retailer B’s sales quantity for retailer
brand in market B.
In this chapter, we are interested in the problem of whether retailer A
should sell the retailer brand product P through the other retailer, B; If it is
better off for retailer A selling her retailer brand product through retailer B,
what are the underlying reasons. In order to study these questions, we model
the problem as a four-stage game. Generally, retailer A needs to procure ex-
tra capacity, establish the relationship with retailer B, or invest in dedicated
sales forces, in order to establish the distribution channel through retailer B.
We believe retailer A’s decision of whether to build the distribution channel
through retailer B (e = 1) or not (e = 0) is a relatively long-run decision com-
pared to the pricing decisions of M and herself. Thus, in our game-theoretical
model, this decision is made in stage one. The fixed development cost f occurs
upon the decision e = 1. In stage two, the manufacturer M sets his wholesale
price wn for the national brand. In stage three, if retailer A sells her retailer
brand through retailer B, she sets the wholesale price wp for the retailer brand;
otherwise, she does nothing. In our setting, the national brand manufacturer
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M operates nationally, while the two retailers operate locally. Thus, we allow
retailer A having the flexibility of setting her wholesale price for the retailer
brand after observing M’s wholesale price of the national brand in our model.
In the final stage, retailer A and B determines their respective sales quanti-
ties for each product in each market simultaneously, as is adopted by most
of the game-theoretical work in literature. We identify the equilibrium of the
game using backward induction. Depending on retailer A’s decision in stage
one, there are two sub-games: e = 0 and e = 1. In each case we consider in
this article, we first solve the equilibrium for the sub-game e = 0. Then, we
identify the equilibrium for the sub-game e = 1. Finally, we assemble the two
sub-games to obtain the equilibrium for the whole game.
5.3 Model Analysis and Findings
In this section, we study the case in which retailer A and retailer B
operate in independent markets. That is, there is no direct competition in
a common market between the two retailers. The only link between them is
through the common national brand product supplier M. In Section 5.3.1, we
first solve the equilibrium for the sub-game e = 0, in which retailer A does
not establish the distribution channel through retailer B. The equilibrium for
the sub-game e = 1 is identified in Section 5.3.2, where retailer A establishes
the distribution channel through retailer B. In Section 5.3.4, we obtain the
equilibrium for the whole game. To simplify the notation, we normalize the
market size of market A to be a = 1.
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5.3.1 3.1 Keeping Retailer Brand Private
In this sub-game, the supplier M charges a wholesale price wn for the
national brand to both retailers. After observing the wholesale price, retailer A
decides the sales quantities for both the national brand and the retailer brand;
while retailer B sets the sales quantity for the national brand simultaneously.
We solve the sub-game using backward induction. Given the wholesale price wn
and retailer B’s sales quantity qBn,B for product N, retailer A sets her quantities
qAn,A and q
A



























2(1−γ) , if wn ≤ 1 − γ;




2(1−γ) , if wn ≤ 1 − γ;
1
2
, if wn ≥ 1 − γ.
(5.2)




p,A, retailer B sets the
















b (1 − wn) . (5.4)
Notice that the quantity decisions of retailer A and B are independent. That
is, they are not functions of the other retailer’s quantity decisions. However,
they affect the decisions of each other indirectly through the choice of the
wholesale price wn by the common national brand supplier M.
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Substituting the values of qAn,A and q
B








1 + b − bwH − wn1−γ
)
, wn ≤ 1 − γ;
1
2
bwH (1 − wn) , wn ≥ 1 − γ.
(5.5)




2+2b(1−γ) , if 0 < γ < γ̂0;
1
2






The equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits are provided in Table
5.2.
When the retailer brand is kept private by retailer A, there exists a
quality level γ̂0 =
1+b
1+2b
for the retailer brand, such that when the quality level
γ of the retailer brand is below the threshold, the manufacturer of the national
brand set his wholesale price low enough to induce retailer A selling both her
own retailer brand and the national brand. When γ exceeds the threshold,
the manufacturer deals exclusively with retailer B and charges the monopoly
wholesale price.
When retailer A sells both the national brand and her own retailer
brand, the equilibrium wholesale price is decreasing in the quality level of the
retailer brand: retailer A uses the retailer brand as a leverage against the
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national brand supplier so as to obtain a better wholesale price. However,
when the quality level of the retailer brand is high enough, retailer A has no
incentive to sell the national brand which cannibalizes the demand for her own
retailer brand. Thus, the national brand only has business with retailer B and
he charges the monopoly wholesale price for the national brand.
From the manufacturer’s point of view, the independent market B pro-
vides a leverage against retailer A who sells her own retailer brand along with
the national brand. The larger the size of market B, the more power the
manufacturer has against retailer A. Thus, as the market size of market B in-
creases, the manufacturer charges a higher wholesale price. At the same time,
the manufacturer is less patient to the price pressure from the retailer brand
sold by retailer A. That is, the manufacturer switch to deal exclusively with
retailer B for smaller quality level of the retailer brand.
Figure 5.1 demonstrate the equilibrium wholesale price wn plotted against
the quality level of the retailer brand for three different values of the market
size of market B.
The above discussion is formally summarized in the following result.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let γ̂0 =
1+b
1+2b
. The equilibrium wholesale price wn in the
sub-game e = 0 has the following properties:
1. wn is decreasing in γ when 0 < γ < γ̂0, and is equal to
1
2
when γ̂0 ≤ γ <
1;
2. wn is increasing in b when 0 < γ < γ̂0;
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3. The threshold value γ̂0 is decreasing in b.
When there is no direct connection between the two retailers, retailer B
serves as a leverage for the manufacturer of the national brand agains retailer A
as discussed above. Thus, as expected, the manufacturer’s profit is increasing
in the market size b of market B. Similarly, retailer B’s profit increases in her
own market size. The large market size of market B obviously hurts retailer A
when she sells the national brand. It is intuitive for the observation that the
manufacturer’s profit is decreasing in the quality level γ of the retailer brand
while retailer A’s profit is increasing. However, it is interesting to observe
that retailer B’s profit is also increasing in γ. This is due to the fact that
when γ increases, the manufacturer’s wholesale price for the national brand
decreases. Thus, retailer B benefits from the reduction of the wholesale price.
The sales quantities behave as we anticipated. The above discussion about the
comparative statics of the equilibrium is formally presented in Table 5.2.
Next, we consider the case in which retailer A sells her retailer brand
through retailer B.
5.3.2 Selling Retailer Brand
Now, we consider the sub-game e = 1. In this case, after observing the
wholesale price wn for the national brand, retailer A sets a wholesale price wp
for the retailer brand. For given values of wn and wp, retailer A decides the
sales quantities qAn,A and q
A
p,A for the national and retailer brands, respectively,
103
























The best response is the same as given in equation (5.2).
Now, retailre B needs to determine the quantities qBn,B and q
B
p,B to sell


























































(1 −wn) , qBp,B = 0, if wn −wp ≤ 1 − γ and γwH ≤ wp
(5.8)
Retailer A sets wholesale price wp anticipating retailer B and her own
quantity decisions to maximize her profit. The optimal wholesale price wp









, 0 ≤ wn ≤ 2(1−γ)2−γ ;








≤ wn ≤ 1.
(5.9)
The quantities and profits for given values of wn can be derived by substituting
wp (wn) to the corresponding function.
In the first stage, M sets the wholesale price wn for the national brand,
anticipating both retailer’s quantity decisions and retailer A’s wholesale price
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The optimal value of wn is given by
wn =
(1 + b) (1 − γ)
2 + b (2 − γ) . (5.10)
The equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits are provided in Table 5.3.
Since retailer A sells her retailer brand to retailer B along with the
national brand and the manufacturer charges the same wholesale price for
both retailers, the manufacturer losses the leverage of dealing exclusively with
retailer B. Thus, the manufacturer will keep doing business with both retailers
as long as he can make a positive profit. Retailer A always sells both the
national brand and the retailer brand at equilibrium.
When the quality level γ of the retailer brand increases, the manufac-
turer faces an increasing price competition from the retailer brand. Thus, the
manufacturer lows his wholesale price for the national brand. However, when
the market size b of market B increases, the sales of the national brand through
retailer B increases. The manufacturer faces less price competition from the
retailer brand. Therefore, the manufacturer is able to charge a higher whole-
sale price for the national brand. Similarly, when b increases, retailer A is
able to increase the wholesale price without reducing the sales for the retailer
brand significantly.
Interestingly, when γ increases, retailer A is not always willing to in-
crease the wholesale price for the retailer brand due to the strategic effect of
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selling the retailer brand through retailer B. When the retailer brand quality
level is relatively high, if retailer A charges a high wholesale price, retailer B
will charge a high retail price for the retailer brand, which enables the supplier
to charge a higher wholesale price for the national brand. Thus, retailer A faces
the trade-off between charging a higher wholesale price for the retailer brand
but inducing a higher wholesale price for the national brand and charging a
lower wholesale price for the retailer brand but enjoys a lower wholesale price
for the national brand. When the market size of market B is not too large,
the effects are not negligible and the net effect is that retailer A’s wholesale
price for the retailer brand may be decreasing in the quality level when it is
relatively large.
The above discussion is formally presented in the following result.
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In sub-game e = 1, the wholesale prices w1n and w
1
p have the following proper-
ties:
1. The national brand wholesale price w1n is decreasing in γ and increasing
in b.
2. The retailer brand wholesale price w1p is concave in γ and increasing in
b.
(a) When 0 < b < b̂1, wp is increasing in γ if 0 < γ < γ̂1 and decreasing
if γ > γ̂1;
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(b) When b > b̂1, wp is increasing in γ.
The manufacturer’s profit behaves similar to the sub-game e = 0: it is
increasing in b and decreasing in γ. Similar results are observed for retailer B’s
profit. The sales quantities also show the same behavior as in the sub-game
e = 0. Surprisingly, retailer A’s profit is concave in both γ and b but not
always monotone in γ and b: retailer A’s profit is not always increasing in γ
and b if she chooses to sell her retailer brand through retailer B. This result
is somewhat counterintuitive. We explain it as follows. When the market
size b of market B is very large, market B is the dominant market. A large
propotion of retailer A’s profit comes from selling the retailer brand through
retailer B. When the quality level γ of the retailer brand is close to that of the
national brand, the two brands are less differentiated. Although the sales from
the retailer brand for retailer A increases, the price competition between the
two brands increases as well. This increasing price competition drives down
both the manufacturer and retailer A’s profit. When b is relatively small
(comparable to the market size of market B), this effect is dominated by the
increase in retailer brand sales and thus retailer A’s profit increases in the
quality level.
For a given quality level, there are two effects when the market size b of
market B increases. First, it increases retailer A’s sales of the retailer brand.
This effect increases as b increases. Second, it increases the price competition
between the two brands. This effect increases as b increases. The net effect
depends on the value of b: when b is very small, the latter effect dominates and
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retailer A’s profit decreases in b. When b is large, the former effect dominates
and retailer A’s profit increases in b.
This discussion is formally presented in the following result.
Lemma 5.3.3. In sub-game e = 1, retailer A’s profit has the following prop-
erties:
1. When 0 < b < 3, π1A is increasing in γ; When b > 3, π
1
A is increasing in
γ when 0 < γ < 2(b+1)(b+3)
b(3b+7)
and decreasing in γ when γ > 2(b+1)(b+3)
b(3b+7)
.
2. There exists a threshold value b̂2 > 0, such that π
1
A is decreasing in b
when 0 < b < b̂2 and increasing in b when b > b̂2.
5.3.3 Effect of Selling Retailer Brand
For the ease of reference, we define the following notation at equilibrium
for each of the two sub-games e = 0 and e = 1. Note that the retailer brand
wholesale price and retailer B’s sales quantity of the retailer brand only exist
in sub-game e = 1.
For any given wholesale price wn for the national brand charged by
the manufacturer, we explore how retailer A and retailer B’s sales quantities
for the national brand will change if retailer A decides to sell the retailer
brand to retailer B. When retailer A keeps the retailer brand private, retailer
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Notation Description
wen National brand wholesale price
w1p Retailer brand wholesale price (in sub-game e = 1 only)
ΠeS Supplier’s profit
ΠeS,j Supplier’s profit from retailer j, where j = A, B
ΠeSC Supply chain’s profit
πej Retailer j’s profit, where j = A, B
πej,n Retailer j’s profit from national brand, where j = A, B
πej,p Retailer j’s profit from retailer brand, where j = A, B
qen,j Retailer j’s sales quantity of the national brand, where j = A, B
qep,j Retailer j’s sales quantity of the retailer brand, where j = A, B
Table 5.1: Notation for equilibrium of sub-game e = 0 and e = 1.
B’s consumers only have one choice, the national brand. Thus, the marginal
consumer is the one who is indifferent between buying the national brand and
not buying at all. To put in another way, the marginal consumer is the one who
derives zero utility from consuming the national brand. When retailer A sells
the retailer brand to retailer B, the consumers of retailer B have an alternative
option: to purchase the retailer brand. When the retail price of the retailer
brand is low enough, the marginal consumer can derive a positive utility from
consuming the retailer brand. Thus, the retailer brand might cannibalize some
of the demand of the national brand. For retailer A, since the wholesale price
of the national brand is given, the sales quantity of the national brand does
not change when retailer A sells the retailer brand to retailer B. Therefore, the
total sales of the national brand decreases after retailer A selling the retailer
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brand to retailer B. In order to minimize the loss, the manufacturer has to
lower his wholesale price. Hence, we anticipate that the equilibrium wholesale
price w1n in sub-game e = 1 is smaller than the equilibrium wholesale price w
0
n
in sub-game e = 0. This result is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3.4. The supplier charges a lower wholesale price for the na-
tional brand when retailer A selling the retailer brand through retailer B than
he would when retailer A sells the retailer brand exclusively in her own store.
That is, we have w0n > w
1
n.
This result has a very important implication for marketing managers.
It demonstrates the strategic effect of a retailer selling her own retailer brand
through another retailer: it helps to induce a lower wholesale price from their
national brand manufacturer. This result complements the traditional results
of competition theory in the sense that it identifies the bright side of com-
petition when the competitors facing a common supplier in the context of
vertically differentiated products market. We thus provide a new angle for the
marketing / operations managers to design marketing / operational strategies
when facing competitions.
When retailer A sells the retailer brand through retailer B, the retailer
brand cannibalizes the national brand demand from retailer B as we described
in previous discussion. This demand cannibalization induces a lower wholesale
price for the national brand from the manufacturer. We thus conclude that
the supplier always achieves lower profit if retailer A sells the retailer brand
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through retailer B. Based on the direct (increasing retailer brand sales) and
the indirect (inducing lower wholesale price for the national brand) effects
of selling the retailer brand through retailer B, we anticipate that retailer A
benefits from doing so. For retailer B, she obtains extra profits from selling
the retailer brand, while enjoying the lower wholesale price for the national
brand at the same time. We also expect that retailer B benefit from selling
the retailer brand.
The following results summarize the effect of selling the retailer brand
through retailer B on retailers’ and supplier’s profits.
Lemma 5.3.5. The equilibrium profits in sub-games e = 0 and e = 1 have the
following properties:
1. Π0S ≥ Π1S, π0A ≤ π1A, π0B ≤ π1B, and Π0SC ≤ Π1SC;






It is noteworthy to point out that retailer A’s profit from retailer brand
sales may not always higher when selling through retailer B. This observation
implies that the extra sales of the retailer brand from retailer B is not the only
drive for retailer A’s decision on selling her retailer brand through retailer B.
In fact, even when selling through retailer B lowers her profit from retailer
brand, retailer A is still willing to do so due to the strategic effect of selling
the retailer brand through retailer B: it helps to induce lower wholesale price
for the national brand from the supplier. The benefit from the lower wholesale
price for the national brand can offset the loss of the retailer brand sales.
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In sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, we observe that the manufacturer’s prof-
its are increasing in market size b of market B. Interestingly, we find that
the profits increase in different rates in the two sub-games. When retailer A
keeps the retailer brand private, retailer B only need to take into account the
wholesale price of the national brand when she decides her order quantity from
the manufacturer. When market size increases, retailer B is able to sell more
units even under a higher wholesale price. Thus, both the wholesale price
and the sales quantity of the national brand at retailer B increase. So does
the manufacturer’s profit. When retailer A sells the retailer brand to retailer
B, however, the manufacturer is not able to increase the wholesale price the
same amount because of the presence of the price competition from the retailer
brand. Therefore, we anticipate the marginal increase is smaller in sub-game
e = 1 than that in sub-game e = 0. The story for the quality level of the
retailer brand is different. When the quality level γ is small, the equilibrium
wholesale price w1n decreases slower than w
0
n when we increase γ; while w
1
n
decreases faster than w0n when γ is large. These results are summarized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.3.6. Let γ̂0 =
1+b
1+2b
. The equilibrium wholesale prices w0n and w
1
n
have the following properties:







> 0; when γ̂0 < γ < 1, we have
∂w0n
∂b





















Given the behavior of the retailers and the manufacturer in both sub-
games, what will be the optimal decision for retailer A to sell the retailer brand
through retailer B or not?
5.3.4 Equilibrium and Implications
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole pricing game describes
the solution to retailer A’s optimal channel structure problem. Retailer A
choose to sell her retailer brand through retailer B if and only if the benefit
of doing so exceeds the fix cost f of establishing the distribution channel. Let
∆πA ≡ π1A−π0A and ∆ΠSC = Π1SC−Π0SC as the benefit from selling the retailer
brand through retailer B for retailer A and the supply chain, respectively.
Proposition 5.3.7. For any given quality level γ of the retailer brand product,
retailer A sells her retailer brand product through retailer B if and only if
f < ∆πA and the supply chain benefits if and only if f < ∆ΠSC.
In the case that the improvement in profit exceeds the fix cost f of
establishing the distribution channel, retailer A is better off selling the retailer
brand through retailer B. We have the similar statement for the whole supply
chain. In this section, we will study the properties of the equilibrium for the
whole game.
When the fix cost f is given, an interesting question arising is, when
does retailer A have more incentive to sell the retailer brand through retailer
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B, with low quality retailer brand or high quality? To answer this question,
we need to understand the benefit of selling through retailer B. First, selling
the retailer brand through retailer B creates extra profit for retailer A. This
profit is increasing in the quality level γ of the retailer brand. However, the
marginal benefit is decreasing in γ. Second, it induces lower wholesale price
for the national brand. Retailer A achieves higher profit from the sales of the
national brand. The benefit increases in the quality level of the retailer brand.
Finally, selling the retailer brand through retailer B reduces retailer A’s profit
from the sales of the retailer brand in market A. When the market size of
market B is too small, the total benefit of selling the retailer brand through
retailer B increases in the quality level of the retailer brand. When the market
size of market B is large enough, the benefit first increases, then decreases in
the quality level of the retailer brand. The properties are summarized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.3.8. The function ∆πA has the following properties:











; however, it is not concave in (0, 1) in general.





, there exists a threshold value b1A > 0, such that
∆πA is increasing in γ if and only if b ≥ b1A; when 0 < b < b1A, it is first
increasing then decreasing in γ.






, there exists a threshold value b2A > 0, such that
∆πA is decreasing in γ if and only if b ≤ b2A; when b > b2A, it is first
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increasing then decreasing in γ.
This lemma has an very interesting implication. It says for a not very
high fix cost f , retailer A only sells her retailer brand through retailer B when
the quality level of the retailer brand is neither too low nor too high. The
result is intuitive when the quality level of the retailer brand is too low. As
mentioned before, there are two effects by selling the retailer brand through
retailer B. First, it induces a lower wholesale price of the national brand from
the supplier. Second, it creates extra profit from the sales of the retailer brand
through retailer B. When the quality level of the retailer brand is too low, the
benefit from both effects is not high enough to offset the fix cost. It is somewhat
counterintuitive that retailer A does not want to sell the retailer brand through
retailer B when the quality level of the retailer brand is too high. At that case,
in sub-game e = 1, the sales of retailer brand from market B decreases as the
quality level of the retailer brand increases; while the wholesale price of the
national brand increases. However, in sub-game e = 0, the wholesale price
of the national brand is constant. Thus, the benefit from selling the retailer
brand diminishing as the quality level of the retailer brand increases. We
formalize the above discussion in the following proposition.







U , 0 ≤ γ1L ≤ γ1U ≤ 1+b1+2b ≤ γ2L ≤ γ2U ≤ 1, such that retailer
A sells the retailer brand through retailer B if and only if γ1L ≤ γ ≤ γ1U or
γ2L ≤ γ ≤ γ2U .
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The two intervals may be separated. This is due to the fact that the
function ∆πA is discontinuous at γ =
1+b
1+2b
. When the market size of market






The function ∆πA is increasing in the market size b of market B. Thus,
we have the following result.
Proposition 5.3.10. For any given fix cost f , there exists a threshold value
bA > 0 such that retailer A sells the retailer brand through retailer B if and
only if b ≥ bA.
The supply chain as a whole may or may not benefit from retailer A
selling the retailer brand through retailer B. Define four mutually exclusive
regions I , II , III , and IV as follows: a) in regions I and II , retailer A does
not sell the retailer brand through retailer B, while in regions III and IV she
does; b) in regions I and III , the supply chain does not benefit from retailer
A selling the retailer brand through retailer B, while in regions II and IV it
does. The following proposition provides characteristics of the four regions.
Proposition 5.3.11. There exists two threshold values b1 and b2, where b1 is






, ∆πA and ∆ΠSC have the following properties:
1. When 0 < b < b1, we have ∆πA > ∆ΠSC;


















3. When b > b2, we have ∆πA < ∆ΠSC.






, we always have ∆πA < ∆ΠSC.






are depicted in Figure ??. It is interesting to see that the
supply chain always benefits from retailer A selling the retailer brand through
retailer B when the quality level of the retailer brand is very high. From the
perspective of the supply chain as a whole, it is socially optimal to use the
retailer brand to create competition in both markets, which reduces the margin
charged by the supplier, therefore reduces double-marginalization. However,
when the quality level is low, the story is not as simple as the former case.
5.4 Effect of Competition
We now extend our basic model analyzed in Section 5.3 by incorpo-
rating competition to further demonstrate the robustness of our key findings.
The analysis in this section shows that retailer A’s decision on selling the re-
tailer brand through retailer B is also affected by the degree of competition
between the two retailers. For expositional simplicity, we consider the case in
which both retailers have no exclusive markets. That is, we consider the full
competition case. In this case, we normalize the market size of market C to
be one.



















Similarly, retailer A sets qCn,A and q
C

















































, if 0 ≤ wn ≤ 2−2γ2+γ ;











≤ wn ≤ 2−γ2 ;





, qC,3n,B = 0, if
2−γ
2
≤ wn ≤ 1.
(5.13)
Notice that the region for retailer A selling the national brand is a
subset of the region for retailer B selling it. Since retailer B has no other
options, she will sell the national brand as long as the profit margin is not
zero. However, for retaler A, she will sell the national brand only when the
profit margin exceeds that of her own retailer brand.
Anticipating both retailers’ optimal response on sales quantities for the
national brand and retailer brand respectively, the supplier sets the wholesale










Substituting the retailers’ best responses in equation (5.13) into supplier’s











≤ γ < 1.
The equilibrium quantities and profits are provided in Table 5.4.
In sub-game e = 1, retailer A sets qCn,A and q
C






























Similarly, retailer B determines qCn,B and q
C
































Depend on the values of wn and wp, the quantity decisions can be characterized
in Table 5.5. The regions are depicted in Figure 5.2.
In stage three, retailer A sets the wholesale price wp for her retailer
brand to maximize her profit for any given value of wn, anticipating the out-
come of the quantity competition in stage two. The detailed analysis can be
found in the appendix. We present the equilibrium for this sub-game in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.1. When retailer A and retailer B competing in the same market,
there exist two threshold values γC1 and γ
C
2 , such that the equilibrium of the
sub-game e = 1 can be characterized as follows:
119
1. When 0 < γ ≤ γC1 , the supplier sets wn = 2−2γ4−γ ; retailer A sets wp =
γ(1−γ)
4−γ ; retailer A sells both products and retailer B sells only the national
brand.




; retailer A sells only the retailer brand and retailer B sells
only the national brand.
3. When γC2 < γ < 1, the supplier sets wn =
(20−γ)(1−γ)
40−22γ ; retailer A sets
wp =
γ(1−γ)(220−31γ)
4(10−γ)(20−11γ) ; retailer A sells only the retailer brand and retailer
B sells both products.
Notice that we have γC1 >
2
3
. It means that retailer A will keep selling
the national brand for higher quality level of the retailer brand. This is due
to the fact that competition between the two retailers provides leverage for
the national brand supplier. It is noteworthy to point out that the strategic
effect of selling the retailer brand through retailer B still exists even under full
competition. That is, selling the retailer brand induces a lower wholesale price
for the national brand. This is clear from the comparison of the equilibrium
wholesale prices in the two sub-games.
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Outcome of Sub-game e = 0 Comparative Statics w.r.t. (γ, b)
























(+, +) (0, +)
qn,A
1+b−2bγ












(+, +) (0, +)
Table 5.2: Equilibrium and comparative statics for sub-game e = 0.
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Table 5.3: Equilibrium and comparative statics for sub-game e = 1.
Outcome of Sub-game e = 0 Comparative Statics w.r.t. γ

























































































































Table 5.5: Retailer A and B’s quantity decisions in market C.
The six regions are defined as follows:
R1w,C =
{











0 ≤ wn ≤












≤ wn ≤ 1 − γ and 1 − γ −wn ≤ wp ≤ γ(3wn−1+γ)4−γ , or













γ (3wn − 1 + γ)





1 − γ ≤ wn ≤ 2−γ2 and 0 ≤ wp ≤ wn − 1 + γ, or
2−γ
2







≤ wn ≤ 1 and
γ
2




(a) b = 0.5
(b) b = 1
(c) b = 5
Figure 5.1: Equilibrium wholesale price wn for the national brand in sub-game
e = 0.
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Figure 5.2: Retailer A and B’s quantity decisions in market C for any given
wholesale prices for the national brand and the retailer brand products.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Directions for Future
Research
In this dissertation, we study varies operational and marketing issues in
supply chain management in the presence of vertically differentiated products,
especially in the context of interactions between private labels and national
brands. We present game theoretical models to study how the presence of ver-
tically differentiated products may change the interactions among supply chain
members and what are the implications to supply chain efficiency. We study
the problem of private label development and distribution. We also investigate
the strategic interactions between product line efficiency and competition when
there are strategic suppliers. The analysis of these models show that it is im-
portant for firms to understand the strategic implications of competition and
product line efficiency. Competition and product line inefficiency cannot be
simply viewed as ”bad” things and spend valuable resources to defend them. It
is critical for the firms’ success to better understand the strategic interactions
among supply chain members when competition and product line inefficiency
emerge in firms’ operations practice, especially when vertically differentiated
products are at presence.
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In Chapter 3, we recognize the role that is played by a retailer’s abil-
ity to develop and produce her own private label product in coordinating a
decentralized supply chain. In contrast to the existing literature, we explic-
itly consider the fact that development costs are often a prerequisite for a
retailer selling her own private label, and we also recognize that a retailer’s
marginal costs may differ from those of a national brand manufacturer, both
absolutely and relative to the qualities of their products. We establish that,
in a decentralized supply chain, the retailer will develop structurally efficient
private labels (if she has the opportunity to do so), but she will also develop
structurally inefficient private labels. While the development of these struc-
turally inefficient private labels always reduces the profit of the national brand
manufacturer, they may or may not lead to higher overall supply chain profits.
Chapter 4 shows that competition from a lower quality entrant may benefit
an incumbent by inducing a lower wholesale price of the critical component
adopted by both the incumbent and the entrant. We are also able to show
that limited capacity on the incumbent’s high end product not only creates
inefficiency in product line, but also can be a credible signal to the critical
component suppliers to induce a lower wholesale price, which implies that
product line inefficiency may play a similar strategic role as a lower quality
entrant without demand cannibalization. Finally, in Chapter 5, we investigate
a retailer’s decision of whether to keep their retailer brand private or sell it
through competitors. Our analysis recognize that the perceived quality level
of the retailer brand, the relative market size of the competitor, and the degree
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of competition play important role in making the decision. In summary, the
theory and insights developed in this dissertation are applicable to operations
and marketing managers’ strategic decision making in various contexts.
Our work is by no means an exhaustive study of the issues we consider.
There are several ways in which one could extend and enrich the models and
analysis in this research. Inclusion of empirical testing of our analytical results,
a richer model of contracts among supply chain members and adoption of more
general models of competition could provide a more nuanced understanding
of the strategic impact of the presence of vertically differentiated products on
a supply chain. Future research could endogenize the product quality deci-
sion and examine the equilibrium product characteristics. In addition, some
national brand manufacturers have their own direct selling channels. The in-
teractions between the direct channel and traditional channels with private
labels is also an avenue for future research. In conclusion, while this disserta-
tion makes some important progress in understanding the interactions among
supply chain members in the presence of vertically differentiated products, it
is by no means a complete study of this field. Hopefully, this initial work can





Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof for Lemma 2.2.1:
Proof. When θ1 ≤ θ2, we have















Thus we have proved result 1. Similarly we can show that result 2 is also
true.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.2:
Proof. If (p1, p2) ∈ R1, we have θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ θ1,2. Thus, only consumers with
valuation θ ≥ θ1 purchases product 1. There are not consumers buying product
2. Thus, we have proved result 1. Results 2 and 3 can be shown similarly.
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1:
Proof. In sub-game d = 0, the vertically integrated channel chooses retail price
pn for the national brand to maximize the profit ΠSC (pn) = π (C, pn, q) and
the solution is given by pn =
1+KC
1+K
. Denote the corresponding profit by Π0SC.
In sub-game d = 1, the vertically integrated channel chooses retail
prices pn and pp for the national brand and the private label to maximize
the total profit ΠSC (pn, pp) = π (C, pn, pp). The profit is jointly concave in
pn and pp in each of the three regions RN , RB, and RP . By taking the first







. When RPM ≤ q, we have (pn, pp) ∈ RN and
the solution is the same as in sub-game d = 0; when q < RPM < 1, we
have (pn, pp) ∈ RB ; and when RPM ≥ 1, we have (pn, pp) ∈ RP . Denote the
corresponding profit by Π1SC .
Obviously we have Π1SC = Π
0
SC when RPM ≤ q and Π1SC > Π0SC when
RPM > q. The vertically integrated channel develops the private label if and
only if Π1SC − Π0SC > g. Thus, when RPM ≤ q, the channel never develops





When q < RPM < 1, let ĝb = Π
1
SC − Π0SC. When g < ĝb, the channel






); otherwise, the private label is not developed (dFB = 0) and
only the national brand is sold (pFBn =
1+KC
1+K
). Similarly, when RPM ≥ 1,
define ĝp = Π
1
SC − Π0SC . When g < ĝp, the channel develops the private label
(dFB = 1) and sells only it (pFBp =
q+Kc
1+K
); otherwise, the private label is not












K (1 − C − q + c)




K (q − c)
















K (1 −C − q + c)
(1 + K) (1 − q)
]K
> 0
since q < RPM < 1. Thus, ĝb is decreasing in c and increasing in C when
q < RPM < 1. Similarly we can show that ĝp is decreasing in c and increasing
in C when RPM ≥ 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1:
Proof. The results regarding the national brand production cost C are obvious.
We establish the results regarding the parameter K. For the retailer’s profit


















It is sufficient to show that the term in the parenthesis is negative for any
values of K > 0. In fact, when K → +∞, the term goes to log (1 −C) which
is negative since 0 < C < 1. Furthermore, the derivative of the term with












K (1 + K)2
> 0.
Thus, the term is strictly increasing and negative and the retailer’s profit πN
is decreasing in K. We can prove that ΠN , ΠNSC, and Q
N
n are also decreasing
in K in a similar way.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2:
Proof. Denote pn (w) =
1+Kw
1+K
, pp (w) =
q+Kc
1+K
, πn (w) = π (w, pn (w) , q), and
πb (w) = π (w, pn (w) , pp (w)).
When 0 ≤ w ≤ c
q
, we have (pn (w) , pp (w)) ∈ RN . From the defi-
nition of π (w, pn, pp), we have π (w, pn, pp) = π (w, pn, q) if (pn, pp) ∈ RN .
The maximizer of π (w, pn, q) is given by pn = pn (w). Thus, (pn (w) , q) will
be a maximizer of π (w, pn, pp) when (pn, pp) ∈ RN . Next, we show that
πn (w) ≥ π (w, pn, pp) if (pn, pp) ∈ RB. Given pp, the unique solution for
∂π (w, pn, pp) /∂pn = 0 is given by
pn (pp|w) =
1 + pp − q + K (pp − c + w)
1 + K
.
We have ∂π (w, pn, pp) /∂pn > 0 when pn < pn (pp|w) and ∂π (w, pn, pp) /∂pn <
0 when pn > pn (pp|w) for (pn, pp) ∈ RB. Thus, π (w, pn, pp) is unimodal for
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any given value of pp when (pn, pp) ∈ RB. In addition, the unique solution
for ∂π (w, pn, pp) /∂pp = 0 on the line pn = pn (pp|w) is given by pp = q+Kc1+K ,
which gives pn =
1+Kw
1+K
. Thus, given pn = pn (pp|w), the function π (w, pn, pp)
is unimodal in pp. Therefore, if (pn, pp) ∈ RB , we have
π (w, pn, pp) ≤ π (w, pp/q, pp) ≤ π (w, pn (w) , qpn (w)) = πn (w)
if pp/q ≥ pn (pp|w). The first inequality is due to the fact that π (w, pn, pp)
is decreasing in pn when pn ≤ pn (pp|w). The second inequality is due to
the fact that π (w, pn, qpn) = π (w, pn, pp) is maximized at pn = pn (w) when
(pn, pp) ∈ RN . If pp/q ≤ pn (pp|w), then we have















1 − Kc − q −Kw
1 + K
,
q (1 −Kc − q − Kw)
1 + K
)
≤ πn (w) .
The first inequality is due to the fact that π (w, pn, pp) is increasing in pn if pn ≤
pn (pp|w). The second inequality is due to the fact that pp ≤ q(1−Kc−q−Kw)1+K if
pn (pp|w) ≥ pp/q. Thus, we have proved that πn (w) ≥ π (w, pn, pp) if (pn, pp) ∈
RB . When (pn, pp) ∈ RP , we have π (w, pn, pp) = π (w, pp + 1 − q, pp) and
(pp + 1 − q, pp) ∈ RB. Thus, we have πn (w) ≥ π (w, pp + 1 − q, pp) = π (w, pn, pp)
when (pn, pp) ∈ RP . Hence, we have proved that (pn (w) , q) is a global maxi-
mizer of π (w, pnpp) when 0 ≤ w ≤ cq .
When c
q
< w < 1 + c − q, we have (pn (w) , pp (w)) ∈ RB which is the
first order solution of maxπ (w, pn, pp) when (pn, pp) ∈ RcB , where RcB is the
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set RB union of the two boundaries qpn = pp and pn = pp − 1 + q. The second
order conditions can be checked as follows:




(pn(w),pp(w)) = − (1 + K)
[
K (1 + c − q −w)









(pn(w),pp(w)) = (1 + K)
2
[
K (q − c)
(1 + K) q
]K−1 [
K (1 + c − q −w)
(1 + K) (1 − q)
]K−1
> 0.
Thus, πb (w) ≥ π (w, pn, pp) when (pn, pp) ∈ RcB . If (pn, pp) ∈ RN , we have
πb (w) ≥ π (w, pn, pp) since π (w, pn, pp) = π (w, pn, qpn) and (pn, qpn) ∈ RcN .
Similarly, if (pn, pp) ∈ RP , we have
πb (w) − π (w, pn, pp) = π
∗
(w) − π (w, pp + 1 − q, pp) ≥ 0
since (pp + 1 − q, pp) ∈ RcB. Therefore, we have proved that (pn (w) , pp (w)) is
a global maximizer of π (w, pnpp) when (pn (w) , pp (w)) ∈ RB .
Similarly, we can prove the results for w ≥ 1 + c − q.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.3:









n (w) , q) (w −C) , if 0 ≤ w ≤ cq ;
Qn
(




(w − C) , if c
q
≤ w ≤ 1 + c − q;
0, if 1 + c − q ≤ w ≤ 1.





≤ C ≤ 1 + c − q; and c) 1 + c − q ≤ C ≤ 1.
We first consider case (c). The condition of case c is equivalent to
RPM ∈ P . In this case, the manufacturer’s profit is zero. Thus, there is
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no participation from the manufacturer and the retailer sells the private label
only. In case (b), the condition is equivalent to q ≤ RPM ≤ 1 which is a
subset of NPH. The unique solution for the first order condition of the second
branch is w = wb = 1+KC−q+c
1+K
. Since 1 − C + c − q ≥ 0, the manufacturer’s
profit Π (w) is concave in w. Thus, the optimal wholesale price is w = wb
and the retailer sells both the national brand and the private label. In case
(a), the unique solution for the first order condition of the first branch is
w = wn = 1+KC
1+K
> wb. The profit Π (w) is concave in each range of the
values for w. Thus, we have the following cases: i) If c
q
≤ wb, then Π (w) is
increasing in w when 0 ≤ w ≤ c
q
. In addition, we have c
q
≤ wb ≤ 1 + c − q.
Thus, the optimal wholesale price is w = wb in this case. The condition
c
q
≤ wb ≤ 1 + c − q is equivalent to Kq
1+K−q ≤ RPM ≤ q; ii) If wb ≤ cq ≤ wn,
then Π (w) is increasing in w when 0 ≤ w ≤ c
q
and decreasing in w when
c
q





≤ wn is equivalent to RPM ∈ NPM ; iii) If wn ≤ c
q
, then Π (w)
is decreasing in w when c
q
≤ w ≤ 1 + c − q. Thus, the optimal value for
w is w = wn. The condition is equivalent to RPM ∈ N . Combining the
results with the retailer’s best response in Lemma 3.3.2, we have proved the
theorem.
Proof of Corollary 3.3.4:
Proof. The results are obvious from the expression of each threshold values.
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Proof of Corollary 3.3.5:
Proof. The results can be obtained by taking derivatives with respect to the
corresponding parameters.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.6:





, and cBU =
q(1+KC)
1+K
. When RPM ∈ P , we have 0 ≤ c ≤ cBL ; when RPM ∈ NPH, we
have cBL < c < c
B
M ; when RPM ∈ NPM , we have cBM ≤ c ≤ cBU ; and when














, cBM ≤ c ≤ cBU ;
1+KC
1+K
, cBU < c ≤ q.
When 0 ≤ c ≤ cBL , the retailer does not carry the national brand. The first
result follows.


































, cBU < c ≤ q.
When 0 ≤ c ≤ cBL , the retailer does not carry the national brand. It is easy




. When c = cBL , we
have QBn < Q
N
n . When c = c
B









have QBn = Q
N
n . It is obvious that Q
B




















, denote by cQ,
such that QBn = Q
N




n when c < cQ, and Q
B
n ≥ QNn
when c ≥ cQ.
The derivative of ΠN − ΠB with respect to c is always nonpositive.
When c = q, we have ΠN − ΠB = 0. Thus, we always have ΠB ≤ ΠN .















CBU = 1 + c − q. For the result regarding the supply chain’s profit, we only
present the proof for the case in which CBL ≥ 0. The proof for other cases












, we show that ΠBSC − ΠNSC is equal to zero at
C = CBL , positive at C = C
B
M , and concave in C . Thus we can conclude that






. In fact, we have ΠBSC − ΠNSC = 0 at
C = CBL . When C = C
B
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]1+K
=





1 + K − q
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q (1 + K)
1 + K − q
]
>




q (1 + K)
1 + K − q + K (1 − q)
]
= 1.






= − K (1 + 2K)
(1 −C) (1 + K)
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, we show that ΠBSC − ΠNSC is unimodal in C , the
minimizer is C = c
q
, and ΠBSC − ΠNSC > 0 when C = cq . Thus we can conclude














. In fact, the
unique solution for the first order condition is C = c
q
. By taking the second























Hence, the derivative of ΠBSC −ΠNSC with respect to C is negative when C < cq
and positive when C > c
q







. Now, it suffices to show that ΠBSC − ΠNSC > 0 when
C = c
q



































, the supply chain profit ΠBSC is constant in C and
ΠNSC is decreasing in C . Thus, it is sufficient to show that Π
B
SC − ΠNSC > 0






















Therefore, we have proved that ΠBSC ≥ ΠNSC and ΠBSC > ΠNSC when
C > CBL .
Combining the above results regarding the manufacturer and the supply
chain’s profits, we have
πB − πN = ΠBSC − ΠB −ΠNSC + ΠN ≥ ΠBSC − ΠNSC.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.7:
Proof. The retailer’s equilibrium private label development decision is ob-
tained by comparing the profits in sub-game d = 0 and d = 1 taking into
account the fixed development cost g. Thus, if and only if πB − πN > g, the
retailer develops the private label. When RPM ∈ N , the private label has no
effect on retailer’s profit. Thus, the retailer does not develop it regardless g.
When RPM ∈ NPM , let ḡn = πB − πN at w∗ = cq and p∗n =
q+Kc
q+Kq
. If g < ḡn,
the increase in profit with private label is more than offsetting the fixed cost
g. Thus the retailer develops the private label. Otherwise, the retailer does
not. Similarly, we can derive the rest of the results by combining the results
in section 3.3.1 and Theorem 3.3.3 and 3.3.6.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.8:
Proof. From Theorem 3.3.6, we have ∆R ≥ ∆SC. Thus, it is sufficient to prove






≤ C ≤ 1 + c − q, we have




















(1 − C)K −
(










≥ 1 + K
K
= 2 ≥ 1 + 2K
1 + K
.






> 0. Since qC ≥ c, we have (1 − q) (1 −C) ≥
1 − C + c − q. Thus, we have ∆SC ≥ ∆V I when c
q
≤ C ≤ 1 + c − q. Finally,
when 1 + c − q ≤ C ≤ 1, we have
∆SC −∆V I = 1
K
[























Thus, we have ∆SC ≥ ∆V I when 1+c−q ≤ C ≤ 1. Therefore, we have proved
that ∆SC ≥ ∆V I for all cases.
Derivation of Retailer’s Optimal Promotional Effort:
We use the following properties to prove Theorem 3.4.1. Denote πn =
π (w, pn, q), π
p = π (w, 1, pp), and π
b = π (w, pn, pp).
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Property B.0.1. When (pn, pp) ∈ RN , the optimal values of x and y are
given by the following:
1. If πn ≥ πp, then x = 1
a




2. If πn ≤ πp, then x = 0 and y = 1
a




Proof. If πn ≥ πp, we have
π (x, y)− π (y, 0) = (y − x) (πp − πn) − 1
2
rax2 ≤ 0.
when 0 ≤ x ≤ y and
π (x, y) − π (x, 0) = (y − x)πp − 1
2
(1 + r) ax2 − 1
2
ay2 ≤ 0.
when 0 ≤ y ≤ x. Thus, we have y = 0. The retailer’s profit can be written
as π = (1 + x)πn − 1
2
ax2 and the optimal value of x is x = 1
a
πn. Substituting
into the profit, we have π = πn + 1
2a
(πn)2. Similarly, we can prove the results
for the case πn ≤ πp.
Property B.0.2. When (pn, pp) ∈ RB , the optimal values of x and y are given
by the following:
1. When πn ≥ πp:
(a) If πn ≥ πb, then x = 1
a
πn and y = 0. The retailer’s profit is




(b) If πn ≤ πb ≤ (1 + r) πn, then x = 1
a














(c) If πb ≥ (1 + r)πn, then x = y = 1
(1+r)a
πb. The retailer’s profit is






2. When πn ≤ πp:
(a) If πp ≥ πb, then x = 0 and y = 1
a
πp. The retailer’s profit is
π = πb + 1
2a
(πp)2.





and y = 1
a
πp. The








(c) If πb ≥ (1 + r) πp, then x = y = 1
(1+r)a
πb. The retailer’s profit is






Proof. We first consider the case in which πn ≥ πp. We show that we must
have 0 ≤ y ≤ x. Otherwise, we have
π (x, y)− π (y, x) = (y − x) (πp − πn) < 0.












ray2 ≤ 0. Thus, we have y = 0 and the retailer’s profit is given by π =
πb + xπn − 1
2
ax2. The optimal value of x is x = 1
a
πn. Substituting into the
profit function gives π = πb + 1
2a
(πn)2. If πb ≥ πn, the solution for the first
order conditions in terms of x is x = 1
a
πn. Thus, if y ≤ 1
a






















πn is equivalent to πb ≤ (1 + r) πn. Similarly, if
y ≥ 1
a
πn, we have x = y and the retailer’s profit is π = (1 + y)πb− 1
2
(1 + r) ay2
and the solution for the first order conditions in terms of y is given by y =
1
(1+r)a




πn is equivalent to πb ≥ (1 + r) πn.
Therefore, we have x = 1
a





, and the retailer’s profit is







if πn ≤ πb ≤ (1 + r) πn; and x = y = 1
(1+r)a
πb





if πb ≥ (1 + r) πn. Similarly,
we can prove the results for the case of πn ≤ πp.
Property B.0.3. When (pn, pp) ∈ RP , the optimal values of x and y are given
by the following:
1. If πn ≥ πp, then x = 1
a




2. If πn ≤ πp, then x = 0 and y = 1
a




Proof. First consider the case πn ≥ πp. If 0 ≤ x ≤ y, we have π (x, y) −
π (y, 0) = y (πp − πn) − 1
2
rax2 ≤ 0. If 0 ≤ y ≤ x, we have π (x, y)− π (x, 0) =
y (πp − πn) − 1
2
ray2 ≤ 0. Thus, the retailer sets y = 0. The retailer’s profit
can be rewritten as π = πp+xπn− 1
2
ax2 and the optimal value of x is x = 1
a
πn.
Substituting into the profit function, we have π = πp + 1
2a
(πn)2. Similarly, we
can prove the results for the case in which πp ≥ πn.
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Proof of Theorem 3.4.1:
Proof. For notational simplicity, denote πn = π (w, pn, q), π
p = π (w, 1, pp),
and πb = π (w, pn, pp). Also denote π̂












. The four constants for the wholesale price are defined as
follows. First, we have w1 =
c
q
and w4 = 1 − q + c. The condition π̂n ≥ π̂p is
equivalent to w ≤ wn−p = 1−q1/(1+K)+cq−K/(1+K), where cq ≤ wn−p ≤ 1−q+c.
The constant w2 can be found as follows. We prove that (1 + r) π̂
n − π̂b is
decreasing in w when c
q











K (1 + c − q − w)






when 0 < r < 1 and c
q
≤ w ≤ 1 − q + c. Thus, if (1 + r) π̂n − π̂b ≥ 0
at w = wn−p, we set w2 = wn−p. Otherwise, there is a unique solution for
(1 + r) π̂n − π̂b = 0 and we set that solution as w2. Then we have w1 ≤
w2 ≤ wn−p and π̂b ≤ (1 + r) π̂n when w1 ≤ w ≤ w2. Similarly, we can
define the constant w3, such that wn−p ≤ w3 ≤ w4 and π̂b ≥ (1 + r) π̂p when
wn−p ≤ w ≤ w3.
Next, we identify the retailer’s best response in each of the five intervals
(some of them may be a single point) defined by the four constants. First, we
consider the case 0 ≤ w ≤ w1 = cq . When pn = p1n, x = 1a π̂n, and y = 0, the
retailer’s optimal profit is given by π∗ (w) = π̂n + 1
2a
(π̂n)2. Now we prove that
π∗ ≥ π (w, pn, pp, x, y) for any values of pn and pp, where x and y are given in
Property B.0.1. We refer to π∗ (w) and π (w, pn, pp, x, y) simply as π
∗ and π
in the rest of the proof when there is no confusion.
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Consider the case of (pn, pp) ∈ RN . From Property B.0.1, if πn ≥ πp,
then π = πn + 1
2a
(πn)2 ≤ π∗ since π is increasing in πn and πn ≤ π̂n. If
πn ≤ πp, then π = πn + 1
2a
(πp)2 ≤ π∗ since π̂n ≥ πp for any values of pp from
the proof of Lemma 3.3.2 and πn ≤ π̂n.
Next, consider the case of (pn, pp) ∈ RB . From the proof of Lemma
3.3.2, we have π̂n ≥ πb for any values of (pn, pp) ∈ RB . From Property B.0.2,
if πn ≥ πp and πn ≥ πb, we have π = πb + 1
2a
(πn)2 ≤ πn + 1
2a
(πn)2 ≤ π∗. If















)2 ≤ π∗ since 1
1+r
πb ≤ πn ≤ πb ≤ π̂n.





. Since πb ≤ π̂n
and 0 < r < 1, we have π ≤ π̂n + 1
2(1+r)a
(π̂n)
2 ≤ π∗. If πn, πb ≤ πp, then
π = πb + 1
2a
(πp)2 ≤ π∗ since πb, πp ≤ π̂n. If πn ≤ πp ≤ πb ≤ (1 + r) πp, then








. Similarly we can check that π is increasing in πp




)2 ≤ π∗ since πb ≤ π̂n.
In the case of (pn, pp) ∈ RP , from Property B.0.3, if πn ≥ πp, we have
π = πp + 1
2a
(πn)2 ≤ π∗. If πn ≤ πp, then π = πp + 1
2a
(πp)2 ≤ π∗. Thus, we
have proved the first result.
Similarly, we can prove the results for other values of w.
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4.3.1:
Proof. The incumbent’s profit function is given by πI (qH, qIL, qEL) = [pH (qH , qIL + qEL) − c − cH ]
[pL (qH, qIL + qEL) − c] qIL, where, qH ≥ 0 and qIL ≥ 0. The profit maximizing















− 2qH − qEL
)
, if 2qH + qEL ≤ 1 − cγ ;
0, otherwise.
Similarly, the entrant solves the problem
max
qEL≥0
πE (qH, qIL, qEL) = [pL (qH, qIL + qEL) − c] qEL,








− qH − qIL
)
, if qH + qIL ≤ 1 − cγ ;
0, otherwise.
There are eight different combinations for the three quantities. To find
the equilibrium quantities for both the incumbent and the entrant, we solve
the equations in each of the eight combinations and check if the conditions are
all satisfied. We omit the details in the paper.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.2:







, we have πNNNI −πNNRI = 0, qNNNH −
qNNRH = 0, and q
NNN











qNNNH − qNNRH =
γ (1 + c + cH) − 2c
2 (4 − γ) =
γ
2 (4 − γ)
(
cH −











qNNNIL − qNNRIL = 0.
Thus, we have proved the results.
Definition of Regions RiNCR, i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
The four regions RiNCR (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) for the values of (c, cH) in lemma
4.3.3 are defined as follows:
R1NCR ≡
{
0 < c ≤ γ
2







4 − 3γ < c ≤
γ
2 − γ and 0 ≤ cH ≤







4 − 3γ < c ≤
γ
2 − γ and
2c − cγ − γ2







2 − γ < c ≤ γ and










2 − γ < c ≤ γ and 0 ≤ cH ≤







2 − γ < c ≤ γ and
2c − γ − cγ
γ
≤ cH ≤





Proof of Lemma 4.3.3:
Proof. Relaxing the constraint qEL ≥ 0 and solve the first order condition for
the entrant, we have qEL = [γ (1 − qH − qIL) − c] / (2γ). When γ (1 − qH − qIL)−
c ≥ 0, we have qEL = [γ (1 − qH − qIL) − c] / (2γ); otherwise, qEL = 0. Thus,
we have the rival’s best response as follows:




, if qH + qIL ≤ γ−cγ ;
0, if qH + qIL ≥ γ−cγ .
(C.1)
Similarly, relaxing the constraints 0 ≤ qH ≤ K and qIL ≥ 0 and
solve the first order conditions for qH and qIL, respectively, we have qH =
1
2
(1 − c − γqEL − 2γqIL) and qIL = 12
(
1 − qEL − 2qH − cγ
)







0, if qEL + 2qIL ≥ 1−cγ ;
1
2
(1 − c − γqEL − 2γqIL) , if 1−c−2Kγ ≤ qEL + 2qIL ≤ 1−cγ









1 − qEL − 2qH − cγ
)
, qEL + 2qH ≤ γ−cγ .
(C.3)
Thus, given the incumbent’s capacity K for product H, the best response sales






















qH = K, qIL =
γ−c
3γ
− K, qEL = γ−c3γ , 0 < c < γ, 0 ≤ cH <
c(1−γ)
γ
, 0 ≤ K ≤ γ−
3γ








, 0 < c ≤ γ















4−γ , qIL = 0, qEL =
γ−c(2−γ)
γ(4−γ) , 0 < c ≤
γ
2−γ , 0 ≤ cH <
c(1−γ)
γ
, K ≥ 2−γ−
4−γ
qH = K, qIL = 0, qEL = 0,
γ









, qIL = 0, qEL = 0,
γ
2−γ < c < γ, 0 ≤ cH <
c(1−γ)
γ





Based on the best responses of the incumbent and the rival, the optimal
capacity level K of the high end product for the incumbent can be found as
follows. When 0 < γ < 1, 0 < c ≤ γ/ (2 − γ), and 0 ≤ cH < c(1−γ)γ , the
























− cHK, if K ≥ 2−γ−c4−γ .
It is a continous function of K and decreasing in the third branch. Solving the
first order conditions for πNCR−1I,1 and π
NCR−1






















KNCR−11 , if K
NCR−1
1 ≤ s−c3s ;
s−c
3s






≤ KNCR−12 ≤ 2−s−c4−s ;
2−s−c
4−s , if K
NCR−1
2 ≥ 2−s−c4−s .










2(2−γ) , if 0 < γ < 1,
γ2









4−γ , if 0 < γ < 1, 0 < c ≤
γ2




if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2
4−3γ < c ≤
γ
2−γ , and 0 ≤ cH ≤
2γ−cγ−γ2
8−2γ .
When 0 < γ < 1, γ/ (2 − γ) < c < γ, and 0 ≤ cH ≤ c (1 − γ) /γ, the





























)2 − cHK, if K ≥ 1−c2 .
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It is easy to check that it is continous in K and decreasing in the fourth
branch. The solutions for the first order conditions for each of the first














(1 − c − cH). Comparing the three maximizers, we have






















KNCR−21 , if K
NCR−2
1 ≤ γ−c3γ ;
γ−c
3γ




≤ KNCR−22 ≤ γ−cγ ;
γ−c
γ






≤ KNCR−23 ≤ 1−c2 ;
1−c
2








KNCR−22 , if 0 < γ < 1,
γ
2−γ < c < γ, and
4c−2γ−3cγ+γ2
2γ
≤ cH < c−cγγ ;
γ−c
γ
, if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2−γ < c < γ, and
2c−γ−γc
γ




KNCR−23 , if 0 < γ < 1,
γ




























4−γ , if 0 < γ < 1, 0 < c ≤
γ2




if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2
4−3γ < c ≤
γ




4−2γ , if 0 < γ < 1,
γ2








if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2−γ < c ≤ γ, and
4c−2γ−3cγ+γ2
2γ
≤ cH < c−cγγ ;
1−c−cH
2
, if 0 < γ < 1, γ






, if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2−γ < c ≤ γ, and
2c−γ−cγ
γ






Proof of Proposition 4.3.4:
Proof. The incumbent’s production quantity qNNRH for the high end product
in model NNR and capacity level KNCR for the high end product in model





0 < c ≤ γ2








4−3γ < c ≤
γ







































Thus, we always have KNCR ≥ qNNRH .































, if 0 < γ < 1, 0 < c ≤ γ2




if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2
4−3γ < c ≤
γ




8(2−γ) , if 0 < γ < 1,
γ2








if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2−γ < c ≤ γ, and
4c−2γ−3cγ+γ2
2γ
≤ cH < c−cγγ ;
(1−c−cH )2
4
, if 0 < γ < 1, γ









− c − cH
)
, if 0 < γ < 1, γ
2−γ < c ≤ γ, and
2c−γ−cγ
γ




It is easy to check that πNCRI ≤ πNNNI . Obviously, we have πNCRI ≥ πNNRI
since the incumbent has more options in model NCR than in model NNR.
Therefore, we have both πNCRI ≤ πNNNI and πNNRI ≤ πNNNI .
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Definition of Regions RiSNR, i = 1, 2:
The two regions RiSNR (i = 1, 2) for the values of (γ, c, cH) in lemma





2 < γ < 1, 0 < c ≤ γ
2 − γ −
√
4γ − 9γ2 + 6γ3 − γ4





























0 < γ < 1, 0 < c < γ, 0 ≤ cH <




Proof of Lemma 4.4.1:
Proof. The supplier’s profit is given as in equation (4.7). Let wSNR1 and w
SNR
2
denote the solution for the first order conditions when qH (w), qIL (w), and
qEL (w) take the values from the upper and lower branches in equation (??),
respectively. Then, we have
wSNR1 =
γ (3 − γ − cH) + 2c
4
, wSNR2 =
1 + c − cH
2
.
The supplier’s profit is concave in w in both the upper and lower branches.
However, we have wSNR1 ≤ wSNR2 . Thus, the supplier’s profit is not concave in
w. The optimal wholesale price w can be found as follows:
wSNR =
{
wSNR1 , if w
SNR
2 ≤ γ(1+cH )2−γ , or wSNR1 ≤
γ(1+cH)







wSNR2 , if w
SNR
1 ≥ γ(1+cH )2−γ , or wSNR1 ≤
γ(1+cH)







where πSNRS,i represents the supplier’s profit if the wholesale price is given by
wSNRi , i = 1, 2. The conditions are simplified as specified in the lemma.
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Definition of Region RSNR:






2 < γ ≤ 3 −
√



































5 < γ < 1, 6γ−4−γ
2



































Proof of Proposition 4.4.2:
Proof. From theorem 4.4.1, the entrant has nonnegative demand when the
supplier sets the wholesale price as w = wSNR1 . In this case, the incumbent’s
profit is given by
πSNRI,1 =
[8 − 2c − (8 − γ) cH − (7 − γ) γ]2
16 (4 − γ)2
.
When the supplier sets the wholesale price as w = wSNR2 , the incumbent’s
profit is the same as that in model SNN. Thus, we only need to compare the
incumbent’s profit in the case when w = wSNR1 to that in model SNN. Let
πSNRI,1 ≥ πSNNI , together with the condition under which w = wSNR1 , we have
the conditions as specified in the proposition.
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For the wholesale price, first, we have wSNR2 = w
SNN . Thus, we only
need to compare wSNR1 with w
SNN . We have
wSNN − wSNR1 =
(2 − γ) (1 − γ − cH)
4
.
Since we have 0 < γ < 1 and 0 ≤ cH < c−cγγ < 1 − γ, we always have
wSNN > wSNR1 . Therefore, we prove the result.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.3:
Proof. From equation (4.8), we can find the first order solutions for wholesale
price w in each of the three intervals. Denote the solutions as wSCN1 (K),
wSCN2 (K), and w
SCN






wSCN2 (K) = 1 − 2K, and wSCN3 (K) = 1+c2 . By checking the conditions for
each first order solution to be the global optimal solution, we have the results
as stated in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.4:
Proof. From Lemma 4.4.3, we know that the incumbent’s profit is concave in K

















, and strictly decreasing in K when K > 1−c
4
. Furthermore, we know








By comparing the conditions for each possible global optimizers, we have the
results as stated in the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4.5:
Proof. The proof comes here...
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Appendix D
Proofs for Chapter 5
Proof of Lemma 5.3.1:
Proof. The results are straightforward from the expression for wn given in
equation 5.6.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.2:
Proof. From Table 5.3, we have w1p =
(1+b)(1−γ)γ
4+2b(2−γ) . It is easy to check that w
1
p
is concave in γ in the interval 0 < γ ≤ 1+b
1+2b






−2 + (−3 + b) b
2 (2 + 3b)2
.







, we have ∂w1p/∂γ ≥ 0. Thus, w1p is increasing in
γ in 0 < γ ≤ 1+b
1+2b







, we have ∂w1p/∂γ < 0
at γ = 1+b
1+2b




2 + 2b −
√
2 (1 + b) (2 + b)
)
. Therefore, we have proved the results.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.3:




(1 + b) (2 + b) (2 (1 + b) (3 + b) − b (7 + 3b) γ)
8 (2 + b (2 − γ))3
.
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The denominator is positive for 0 < γ ≤ 1+b
1+2b
. The numerator is decreasing
in γ. Thus, it is sufficient to show that the numerator is positive at γ = 1+b
1+2b
.
Substituting γ = 1+b
1+2b
into the numerator, we get (1 + b)2 (2 + b) (6 + b) > 0.
Thus, we have shown that π1A is increasing in γ.




(1 − γ) γ (2 (4 + γ) + b (8 − γ (8 − 5γ)))
4 (2 + b (2 − γ))4
≥ 0.
Thus, π1A is convex in b.
Therefore, we have proved the results.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.4:
Proof. Denote win as the equilibrium wholesale price for the national brand in
sub-game e = i, i = 0, 1. Then we have
w0n =
(1 + b) (1 − γ)
2 + 2b (1 − γ) , and w
1
n =
(1 + b) (1 − γ)
2 + b (2 − γ) .
Taking the difference, we have
w0n − w1n =
(1 + b) (1 − γ) bγ
2 (2 + 2b − bγ) (1 + b − bγ) > 0,
since we have 0 < γ < 1 and b > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.5:
Proof. As specified in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, the supplier’s profits satisfy
the following:
Π0S −Π1S =
(1 + b)2 (1 − γ)
8 + 8b (1 − γ) −
(1 + b)2 (1 − γ)
8 + 4b (2 − γ) > 0
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since 2 (1 − γ) < 2 − γ for 0 < γ < 1. To prove π1A ≥ π0A, we use the property
that π1A − π0A is concave in γ from Lemma 5.3.8. It is sufficient to prove that
π1A−π0A ≥ 0 at both γ = 0 and γ = 1+b1+2b. It is easy the check that π1A−π0A = 0
at γ = 0. When γ = 1+b
1+2b
, we have
π1A − π0A =
b2 (6 + b (13 + 2b (4 + b)))
16 (1 + b)2 (2 + 3b)2
≥ 0.
Thus, we have π1A − π0A ≥ 0. For the supply chain, we have
Π1SC −Π0SC =
b (1 + b)2 (1 − γ) γ (3 + b (3 − 2γ))
16 (2 + b (2 − γ))2 (1 + b − bγ)
≥ 0.
Similarly, for retailer B, we can show that π1B − π0B is concave in γ. At γ = 0,
we have π1B − π0B = 0; while
π1B − π0B =
b2 (1 + b (1 + b) (11 + 8b))
16 (1 + b)2 (2 + 3b)2
≥ 0
when γ = 1+b
1+2b
. Thus, we have π1B − π0B ≥ 0. We have proved the results in
item 1.
For result 2, we have
π1A,p − π0A,p =
(1 + b) γ (4 + b (5 + b − (3 + b) γ))
8 (2 + b (2 − γ))2
− (1 + b) γ
8 + 8b (1 − γ) .
We can show that π1A,p − π0A,p is concave in γ when 0 < γ ≤ 1+b1+2b . Solve






0 < γ ≤ 1+b
1+2b
. Therefore, we have proved result 2.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.7:
Proof. From the definition of equilibrium, the proof is trivial.
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Proof of Lemma 5.3.8:
Proof. The concavity of ∆πA in γ is built by showing that the second derivative
of ∆πA with respect to γ is nonpositive. Since ∆πA is concave in γ, ∆πA will











b (1 + 2b)2 (−12 + b (−32 + b (−25 + b (−8 + b (−3 + 2b)))))
16 (1 + b)4 (2 + 3b)3
.
The term in the second paranthesis of the numerator is increasing in b. It is
negative at b = 0. While it goes to infinity when b goes to infinity. Thus,




b = b1A. The results follows from the concavity of ∆πA.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.9:
Proof. The result follows from the concavity of ∆πA and Proposition 5.3.7.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.10:
Proof. The result follows from the fact that ∆πA is increasing in b.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.11:
Proof. Solve ∆πA = ∆πSC for γ, we have the following four solutions:
γ = 0, 1,
(1 + b)
(














It is easy to check that γ2 > 1. γ1 ≥ 0 if and only if b ≤ 3. When b >
3, ∆πA − ∆πSC ≤ 0 for any 0 < γ ≤ 1+b1+2b . When γ1 ≥ 1+b1+2b, we have
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∆πA − ∆πSC ≥ 0 for any 0 < γ ≤ 1+b1+2b, which is equivalent to 0 < b ≤ b1,
where b1 is the unique solution of 2b
3 + 3b2 − 3b − 3 = 0 in (1, ∞). When
b1 < b < 3, we have ∆πA −∆πSC ≥ 0 when 0 < γ < γ1 and ∆πA −∆πSC ≤ 0
when γ1 < γ ≤ 1+b1+2b . We hence prove the results.
The Six Regions in Table 5.5:
The six regions are defined as follows:
R1w,C =
{













≤ wn ≤ 1 − γ and 1 − γ −wn ≤ wp ≤ γ(3wn−1+γ)4−γ , or







0 ≤ wn ≤










1 − γ ≤ wn ≤ 2−γ2 and 0 ≤ wp ≤ wn − 1 + γ, or
2−γ
2











γ (3wn − 1 + γ)







≤ wn ≤ 1 and
γ
2
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